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In concept, online communities allow people to access the wide range of
knowledge and abilities of a heterogeneous group of users. In reality, current
implementations of various online communities suffer from a lack of partic-
ipation by the most qualified users. The participation of qualified users, or
experts, is crucial to the social welfare and widespread adoption of such sys-
tems. This research proposes techniques for identifying the most valuable
contributors to several classes of online communities, including question and
answer (QA) forums and other content-oriented social networks. Once these
target users are identified, content recommendation and novel quantitative in-
centives can be used to encourage their participation. This research represents
an in-depth investigation into QA systems, while the major findings are widely
applicable to online communities in general. An algorithm for recommending
content in a QA forum is introduced which can route questions to the most
appropriate responders. This increases the efficiency of the system and reduces
vi
the time investment of an expert responder by eliminating the need to search
for potential questions to answer. This recommender is analyzed using real
data captured from Yahoo! Answers. Additionally, an incentive mechanism
for QA systems based on a novel class of incentives is developed. This mecha-
nism relies on systemic rewards, or rewards that have tangible value within the
framework of the online community. This research shows that human users
have a strong preference for reciprocal systemic rewards over traditional re-
wards, and a simulation of a QA system based on an incentive that utilizes
these reciprocal rewards outperforms a leading incentive mechanism according
to expert participation. An architecture is developed for a QA system built
upon content recommendation and this novel incentive mechanism. This re-
search shows that it is possible to identify the most valuable contributors to an
online community and motivate their participation through a novel incentive
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Untapped capabilities permeate large-scale networks. Search engines
specialize in identifying existing static documents on a network that are ap-
propriate for a given query. Online communities such as question and answer
(QA) forums, discussion forums, social networks, and news aggregators pro-
vide a method of connecting users and resources that can leverage both the
static and dynamic (live) capabilities of a network of human users.
This research focuses on identifying content creators, or experts with
desired knowledge, and motivating them to contribute to the social benefit of
the online community.
No single user has complete knowledge across many different domains.
On a large enough network, however, it is likely that somebody has exper-
tise in nearly every domain. This research proposes techniques to facilitate
the voluntary flow of information from one human user to another. These
techniques are combined in an architectural framework for a QA system that
will allow users to answer questions best addressed by human experts, such as
personalized recommendation. For such a system to be successful, it is essen-
tial that it be able to identify and access experts in any given area, connect
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the responder(s) to the original questioner, and motivate potential responders
to participate. This research proposes novel techniques for identifying exper-
tise, a recommendation-based architecture for matching content creators and
consumers, and a quantitative incentive mechanism for encouraging expert
participation in an online community populated by a set of greedy users, or
agents.
Online communities are enabled by the prevalence of popular websites
built upon social technology. Websites built on user generated content (UGC)
are prevalent, and the perceived value of this content is growing rapidly [78].
Sites like Twitter, Yelp, Digg, Reddit, eBay, Yahoo! Answers, Amazon, and
many others rely on content that is created by their users, whether it is product
reviews and descriptions, restaurant suggestions, movie recommendations, or
any other kind of information. Often these websites allow each user to create
an online identity. Through contributions to the site, users build a reputation
through the collective whole of other users. This reputation and its associated
measure of trust form the essence of an online community.
An effective QA system must facilitate the sharing of information. A
question is provided by a user called a questioner and any other user (called a
responder) is capable of reading this question and providing a response. QA
systems provide a forum for typically human users to post questions and others
can provide responses. Some early QA systems have been in use since the 1950s
and simply take the form of a regular column in a printed trade journal [26].
The most sophisticated QA systems today use data analysis techniques to pair
2
questioners and responders [1]. This research leverages models of user expertise
based on previous participation to drive a recommendation architecture that
pairs questioners and responders. In addition, the experimental system uses a
novel incentive mechanism based on extrinsic reciprocal rewards to encourage
participation from the most qualified users. Questions are usually classified as
open or closed. Open questions are questions that accept additional responses.
Open questions become closed after a period of time or by the request of the
questioner. The scope can be as narrow as a single highly specialized field,
such as zero gravity combustion, or broad enough to include countless topics
from mathematics, to music, to the culinary arts. Many QA systems, such as
Yahoo! Answers [4], manage a broad scope by forcing questioners to label their
questions into a certain category, such as philosophy. Each category essentially
functions as a separate forum, with its own audience and participants. The
only thing these category participants have in common is an interest, but not
necessarily expertise, in the category.
Modeling the abilities of users in a network-based QA system requires a
measure of certainty in the information content passed along such a network,
as well as the capabilities and intent of the source of the information, the
responder. Trust is a measure of the fidelity or truthfulness of a responder and
can be established in two ways. First, repeated interactions coupled with direct
observations can be used by the questioner to construct a trust model [41]. A
responder that provides poor information or is deceitful has a low measure
of trustworthiness. The second method for establishing a trust model is the
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exchange of reputation information [60]. One trusted agent on a network
may have experience with another particular agent, while others may not.
Such an agent can share the trustworthiness findings of its own experience,
allowing participants to quickly bootstrap their own trustworthiness models
of the responder. Trust is not limited to a single measure; multi-dimensional
trust can be established based on the quality of the answer provided, timeliness
of the answer, percentage of questions the responder is available to answer and
more [31].
QA systems often do not explicitly address the concept of trust; it is
assumed that participants are honest and have nothing to gain through deceit.
Deceitful or poorly communicated information generates the same effect as an
honest, though unsatisfactory response. Properly evaluating a response also
requires a measure of expertise. A deceitful response may appear genuine to
the original questioner, but another expert could identify malicious intent.
Through a feedback driven incentive mechanism, a QA system can distinguish
between fraudulent behavior such as spam and a simple lack of expertise and
can adjust incentives accordingly.
Closely related to trust is the concept of an expertise metric. Instead
of modeling the fidelity of the answer or the trustworthiness of the responder,
expertise is a topic-specific measure of the abilities and will of a networked
agent, independent of intent or trustworthiness. Topic specificity means an
agent may contain high expertise in one topic, such as gardening, and low
expertise in another, such as language skills. In the context of QA systems,
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expertise is defined as “the ability of a user to answer a given question to the
satisfaction of the questioner.” [15] Like trust, this research develops expertise
models in the following two distinct ways. First, the historical content supplied
by an agent can be analyzed. Using standard data mining techniques, previous
agent activity can be parsed and clustered into topics. An agent demonstrating
higher activity levels among certain topics suggests expertise in that topic.
Much like trust model evolution, a feedback loop indicating satisfactory or
inadequate activity can be used to alter the expertise model for a specific
topic. The second source of information for building expertise models is the
connectivity graph between networked agents. If agent A has high expertise in
topic X, agent B has an interaction with A concerning X, and A indicates a
satisfactory experience with B, it can be concluded that agent B has expertise
in topic X. This means that expertise models can be developed using the
actual content of a networked agent’s activity as well as using the network
graph structure in a feedback loop.
Beyond expertise and trust, is influence, a third analysis tool for QA
which enables user comparisons in a complex networked environment. Influ-
ence is a function of expertise and the activity, or participation level, of a
networked entity. A networked agent’s activity level can be ascertained by the
number and weight of edges in a graph. The most influential agents are not
always those containing the most expertise, nor are they always the ones with
the most activity. Influential agents are those that have the most impact on
network activity. In the context of a QA system, such activity includes creat-
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ing highly rated answers to difficult questions, posting of insightful questions,
or even quickly posting answers to simple questions.
Many QA systems are currently open for public participation. The
largest such system, Yahoo! Answers (YA), boasts over 120 million users and
more than 400 million answers [51]. These figures indicate a participation
of only 3.3 responses per user. In reality, many users will post one or more
questions and never supply a response to another. Moreover, the knowledge
shared in Yahoo! Answers is very broad but not very deep [2]. Categories
exist for topics as diverse as astronomy, celebrities, relationships, computer
programming, and many more. In a study performed by Adamic et al., only
1% of the questions in the Programming category required expertise above the
level of a student with a single year of experience [2]. This indicates a lack
of question depth in YA. It is possible that this shallow depth drives away
users with higher expertise because they feel they have nothing to gain by
responding to shallow questions, and they lack confidence in the abilities of
the responders.
Smaller, more specialized QA systems have been developed to combat
this shallow question phenomenon and draw out valuable experts. One such
example, Experts-Exchange (EE), focuses on computer and information tech-
nology related questions. Its users are mostly young to middle aged males
in the IT sector [67], and it contains over 17 million solutions from 260,000
contributors and 3.9 million viewers [37]. EE makes a distinction between
members and contributors, or experts. Members must pay a fee to access the
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archived solutions and ask new questions. Experts must periodically partici-
pate by answering questions to maintain their status as an expert as well as
their archive and ask privileges. An expert’s solution is evaluated by the ques-
tioner, which influences an expert’s status. The mechanism driving EE is based
on the idea that people are willing to either pay money (and become a mem-
ber) or satisfactorily answer questions (and become an expert) in exchange
for the ability to ask questions and access the archive. This type of reward
is called a systemic reward , meaning the user is provided with something of
value within the context of the system in exchange for valuable participation.
Choosing a reward with meaningful value is an important part of the process
of designing an incentive mechanism, and this is discussed more thoroughly in
section 5.1.
A key characteristic of the Experts-Exchange mechanism is that a credit
value is maintained. This credit can be earned and spent by responding to and
asking questions [21]. A rapidly growing QA site named Stack Overflow yields
the quickest responses of any major public QA site [55], and the designers
of Stack Overflow extend this idea in the form of bounties. A bounty is an
additional number of reward points that the question asker offers in exchange
for a satisfactory answer. This sort of mechanism may allow a user to garner
a large set of responders for an urgent question, but it is not without draw-
backs. This spending of credit discourages a user from asking questions. This
questioner inhibition causes many questions to never be asked, even though
they may be of great value to other users once answered. The incentives for
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online communities developed in this research are based on meaningful re-
wards, but influence cannot be spent. Also, the proposed system combats the
shallow question phenomenon not by restricting scope, but by recognizing and
encouraging expert participation across all disciplines.
1.1 Problem Statement
Many different online communities, including question and answer sys-
tems are currently available, but they all suffer from a similar set of problems.
First is a lack of participation. It is beneficial to encourage expert partici-
pation from users in order to reliably secure valuable content, thus directly
adding value to the community. In addition to content creator participation,
consumer participation is also desirable. In the context of QA systems, formu-
lating a detailed question requires skill and effort, and the presence of richer
and more varied questions draws out the expertise of the responders. Spend-
ing credit when asking a question discourages frivolous questions, but it also
does so at the expense of less content on the QA system. A major barrier
toward participation is the time investment needed by a content creator to
find an appropriate piece of content to create or an appropriate question to
answer. The most highly qualified experts are likely to be very busy, there-
fore they are often unwilling to browse or search through a large collection
of open questions until they find a suitable match. This research addresses
this lack of participation by providing meaningful incentives for participation
and by making it easier to participate in a constructive manner through a
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recommendation-based architecture.
A second problem with current online communities is a lack of confi-
dence in the expertise and trustworthiness of the content creators. For ex-
ample, if a question is viewed by only the most recent visitors or those who
chose to scan a long list of questions, the questioner has no reassurance that
those who respond are qualified or honest. Current systems reward certain
behaviors, such as answering a question, and this reward is in the form of
a user score. This score does not accurately represent the value of a user
in the QA system because the score is created by simple actions or evalua-
tions by the original questioner, who may not be best qualified to judge the
value of a response. This research addresses this lack of confidence through
a recommendation-based architecture that matches questions with qualified
experts and a collaborative aggregative incentive mechanism that uses the col-
lective peer expertise to reward the most valuable contributors. Because a
question is routed to those who have demonstrated experience on that topic,
a questioner can be assured that his question has been seen by some of the
most capable potential responders.
A third problem with current online communities is that they suffer
from various social phenomenon such as nepotism, reciprocity, and bandwagon
effects. This is discussed in section 2.2.3. The social mechanisms behind
online communities are intended to drive higher participation, increase user
retention, and build a sense of community among the user base. Often these
social mechanisms backfire and have unintended consequences. Section 4.2
9
describes an algorithm for unbiased trust estimation. This measure of trust
is designed to counter the deleterious effects of social mechanisms in online
communities, and allow the most valuable content creators to be identified.
1.2 Research Questions
This research will examine the following hypothesis:
In an online community, a non-monetary quantitative incentive
mechanism applied to a recommendation-based architecture can in-
crease expert participation and satisfaction - both as a content cre-
ator and a consumer - and assure confidence in the value of the
provided answers.
The hypothesis asserts that a quantitative incentive mechanism, built
from observing the behavior of users, can effectively increase beneficial system-
wide properties such as expert participation as well as accurate, timely, and
trustworthy content generation. The mechanism is based on the idea of re-
ciprocal systemic rewards. These rewards are given to those demonstrating
the highest levels of expertise, and they in-turn have the greatest systemic
influence over others. Thus, the most influential users are rewarded by oth-
ers’ prompt, satisfactory responses when they pose a question. The reward is
designed to encourage expert participation. The hypothesis is tested by the
following research questions.
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1.2.1 Research Question 1 - Measuring Expertise
RQ 1: How can the expertise of a user in an online community be
measured?
In an online community made of human volunteers, some users will
create more valuable content than others. Some users may have proficiency in
a certain topic - such as books and authors - while others may demonstrate
proficiency in another domain. A fundamental tenet of this research is that
nobody knows everything, but everybody knows something. The first step
toward encouraging expert participation is identifying those who are consid-
ered experts. Recommendation is closely related to expertise identification
because some users may be desired for their expertise in certain domains but
not in others. An effective recommendation engine can match content creators
with content consumers in order to fulfill a need, regardless of some general
expertise metric. Such a recommendation engine is described in section 4.1
Expertise can be identified using techniques described in chapter 4. Ex-
pert responders are highly desirable in a QA system because they are capable
of answering very difficult questions that others cannot. Expertise is identi-
fied through a multi-dimensional topic-specific expertise model [15]. Essen-
tially these techniques draw from two sources of information: content-based
information and link-based information. Content-based expertise identifica-
tion techniques involve analyzing the text content generated by users in an
attempt to ascertain the skill level of the user. Link-based expertise identifica-
tion techniques use the underlying graph structure generated from the social
11
interactions of the users within the community. It is important to note that
simply measuring node properties such as in degree in a question and answer
graph are insufficient for determining the true expertise level of a user because
social effects often outweigh the value of the content produced by a user. Sec-
tion 4.2 describes a more sophisticated method for identifying experts based
on the link structure of a social network.
1.2.2 Research Question 2 - Choosing an Incentive
RQ 2: How effective are systemic reciprocal rewards for encourag-
ing expert participation in an online community?
RQ1 discusses how to identify experts in a community. Once this tar-
get demographic is identified, we must encourage their participation for the
community to maximize its value to its own users. One way to encourage
participation is to lower the barriers of entry. The recommendation system
presented in section 4.1 frees a user from searching through a database of
potential questions in order to find one that is appropriate to answer.
Beyond this, various incentive mechanisms have been used in online
communities to encourage participation. Fundamentally, an incentive mecha-
nism rewards a user who exhibits socially beneficial behavior by giving him/her
something of value. Yahoo! Answers and many similar sites reward contribu-
tors with arbitrary points for positive contributions. Additionally, they may
offer a leader board position, or virtual trophies and badges. For many users of
such systems these rewards are meaningless. This research attempts to iden-
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tify a reward that is valuable to a larger portion of the users. Such meaningful
rewards are called systemic rewards because they add value within the frame-
work of the system. They are designed to give extra functionality, enjoyment,
or ease of use to the awardee. For example, in a QA system a potential sys-
temic reward is priority access to potential responders when asking a question.
This reward is said to be reciprocal because the reward gained by a content
creator is a function of the social influence of the user who requested the con-
tent. In the context of QA, a question asked by a user in high standing is
“worth more” than a question asked by a user in lower standing. Section 5.1
presents a survey that was administered to evaluate the desirability of such a
reward for QA systems. This research direction attempts to demonstrate that
access to peer generated content can directly motivate people to apply their
own expertise, thereby generating more content.
1.2.3 Research Question 3 - Mechanism Design
RQ 3: In the context of a question and answer system, how can an
incentive mechanism be designed to encourage expert participation?
RQ1 raises the question of identifying desirable experts in an online
community. RQ2 lays the foundation for encouraging their participation by
establishing a meaningful reward. RQ3 concerns fully developing and measur-
ing an incentive mechanism based on such a reward. Once a reward is chosen,
it must be carefully distributed to the users in order to encourage positive
behavior and discourage negative behavior. Such a mechanism is said to be
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incentive compatible.
Some examples of beneficial responder behavior in QA include the cre-
ation of prompt, relevant, and correct (where applicable) responses. Examples
of beneficial questioner behavior include asking rich questions, such as asking
for advice pertaining to a detailed situation. One of the greatest strengths
of QA is that humans are capable of answering more sophisticated questions
than those most suited to an internet search query. The incentive mechanism
must be designed to encourage such beneficial behaviors.
In addition to encouraging beneficial behavior, the incentive mecha-
nism must discourage harmful behaviors. First, false or biased responses to
questions can cause harm and should be minimized. Second, spam is a ma-
jor concern for internet-based QA systems. While perhaps not as harmful as
false information, unintelligible responses are of no use. This could be caused
by something as straightforward as language issues, or unintelligibility can be
symptomatic of something deeper, such as a large disparity of expertise be-
tween the questioner and the responder for the question topic. A third point
of concern for many QA systems is each user’s question to answer ratio. A
forum full of questions with very few answers is of little use. Likewise, a
QA system with too few questions is underutilizing the skills of its user base.
This research does not propose discouraging questions; it proposes encouraging
strong responses.
A QA system incorporating a recommender coupled with the proposed
incentive mechanism could facilitate such behavior by recommending appro-
14
priate questions for a responder in order to minimize the time investment spent
searching for a question to answer. This would encourage more responder par-
ticipation by experts. Another beneficial effect of such a QA system is that
questioners would have increased assurance in the accuracy and honesty of the
responses. Incentives in currently available QA systems do not encourage hon-
est participation (both asking and responding to questions) by experts. They
assign points for very simple actions. The research in this dissertation allows
the community to decide which content is most useful, with experts weighing
in more heavily.
Section 5.2 presents an incentive mechanism for QA systems and demon-
strates its performance in a software agent-based simulation. This simulation
was created to model the behaviors of real users in several different QA sys-
tems today, including Yahoo! Answers and the Java Forum. This simulation
directly compares the performance of a leading industry incentive mechanism
to the incentive mechanism presented in this research. The proposed incentive
mechanism is designed to preserve beneficial system-wide behavior while each
agent attempts to maximize its own utility, or influence. It has been estab-
lished that humans do not always behave in a rational manner [43], whereas
software agents do so by definition. However, section 5.1 establishes that sys-
temic reciprocal rewards are in fact desirable to the majority of users, and it
is expected that they will behave rationally.
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1.3 Contributions
This dissertation will form the foundation for a new class of online
communities. Such systems will not rely on monetary payment for partici-
pation but will reward contributors with influence in the system. Those who
contribute the most value will be rewarded with the effort of others, in the
form of priority given to their own questions. Nobody knows everything, but
everybody knows something. A professor of computer science may answer a
very difficult question on complexity theory, but then have a simple question
about gardening. This user has valuable expertise, and he or she is a desired
participant. He or she will be rewarded when asking a simple question about
gardening because a responder will earn greater rewards when answering his
or her question than another. Not all questions are difficult. Many do not
require very specialized or broad expertise. Therefore, it is desirable to reward
participation, even if the participant is not an expert. For example, a teenager
may not have much expertise, but he may have plenty of free time to spend
answering questions. The incentive mechanism in this research rewards such
behavior.
In developing this QA system, several basic contributions must be ac-
complished. First is a multi-dimensional topic-specific model of expertise.
This model of expertise is useful for identifying desirable contributors to a QA
system. Section 4.2 introduces another model of expertise and trust that is
applicable to social networks in general. These models are a necessary step
toward calculating the influence and desirability a user has in the system. The
16
second contribution of this research is the concept of systemic rewards. Choos-
ing a reward that is meaningful to the largest group of users is of key import
when building a system designed to encourage the strongest expert participa-
tion. The third contribution is the full implementation of an influence-based
incentive mechanism for encouraging beneficial behavior. The fourth contri-
bution is a novel architecture for a recommender based question and answer
system using the proposed incentive mechanism. More generally, this research
is the first to show that peer generated content can be effectively used to
encourage expert participation in online communities.
The power of online communities is unrealized. Question and answer
systems are a great example of underutilized online communities. Internet
search has become the norm, but many questions are unsearchable using to-
day’s paradigm of feeding keyword-based search queries into a search engine
and then digesting the results. Such questions are often concerning advice,
recommendations, or very specialized knowledge. Even a question as innocu-
ous as choosing which bicycle to purchase can be very difficult. Using a search
engine, a person would have to decide which type of bike suits his needs by
reading tutorials on bicycle purchases, and then he would have to search the
inventory of several different manufacturers and match this list with the pric-
ing and availability at local bicycle shops. Once a short list is created, he
would have to compare each bicycle before making a decision. With an effec-
tive QA system, an expert can give a model name that would be well-suited
to the questioner’s requirements, perhaps with localized content such as price,
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availability, or alternative models. In the first scenario only the original ques-
tioner had to expend effort while in the second scenario both the questioner
and the responder(s) did. With an effective QA system, the total sum effort
expended is significantly less. This research facilitates this type of interaction
by encouraging expert participation through new techniques for identifying
experts and a novel non-monetary incentive mechanism.
1.4 Outline
The purpose of this research is to encourage expert participation in
online communities. This document discusses the full stack of tasks needed
to accomplish this goal, including identifying a target set of experts, choosing
an incentive, and distributing rewards in an efficient manner. Experimental
support is provided within each section introducing new technology.
Chapter 2 contains a discussion of related work and how the research
proposed here differs and complements existing work. The chapter opens with
a discussion on motivation and the theory behind the incentive mechanism.
Next, several different QA systems are discussed, along with their respective
strengths and weaknesses. Specifically, this chapter includes discussion of the
currently available incentive mechanisms that drive existing QA systems. The
QA system proposed by this research attempts to address their shortcomings
while preserving their benefits. In addition, chapter 2 discusses the current
state of the art in expertise modeling and recommendation. The roles of trust
in forming expertise models and in social networks are also discussed.
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Chapter 3 introduces a high level architecture for a novel question and
answer system. A question and answer system is a prototypical online com-
munity, and this serves as a concrete application domain for the technology
developed in this dissertation. This architecture is referred to throughout
the dissertation and serves to illustrate how the different pieces of technology
interact to form a cohesive system. This is followed by a discussion of the
architecture from the viewpoint of a user and again from the viewpoint of a
recommendation agent.
Chapter 4 describes techniques for identifying experts in online com-
munities. First is a technique suited for QA sites based on a generative model
of user behavior. This technique utilizes both link-based information and
content-based information. Following this is a technique for identifying the
most trustworthy expert users in another type of online community, a news
aggregator. Both of these techniques are presented with experimental support.
Chapter 5 discusses the design and development of a novel incentive
mechanism for online communities. Early in this chapter, section 5.1 evaluates
the results of a survey designed to investigate the choice of reciprocal systemic
rewards. The remainder of the chapter discusses the design of a full mechanism
and the performance of a software simulation of a question and answer system
operating on this mechanism.
Chapter 6 states the contributions of this research and addresses the
original hypothesis and research questions. This chapter also describes the




Effectively encouraging expert participation in an online community
has several steps. First, human behavior must be understood as it pertains to
peer production systems such as web-based QA [8]. Why do people participate
in question and answer systems (QA)? Is there some perceived reward that
will be received in exchange for participation? Does the act of participating
in a QA system become its own intrinsic reward? Second, we must identify
our target audience. Who do we want to encourage participation from? What
kind of behavior are we looking for? Are there any behaviors we wish to dis-
courage? Social roles are useful for answering these questions and identifying
a target participant. Social roles are described as characteristic communi-
cation patterns between network members, or a “structural signature” [84].
Once an idealized target audience is identified, it is necessary to model the
population of system users and selectively reward those who exhibit beneficial
behaviors. These user models can take many forms, and this work proposes
a topic-specific expertise model, which is rooted in the trust in multi-agent
systems research community.
When paired with participation models, these expertise models can
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communicate the value of a user in the community. It is imperative to identify
the most valuable users and encourage their participation in order to max-
imize the social welfare of the system. Many existing QA systems attempt
to identify and reward positive behaviors in users, but they typically rely on
questionable rewards and very simple user models. This chapter will establish
the foundation of the proposed incentive mechanism based on collaborative
aggregation. With the expertise models and incentive mechanism in place, it
is possible to construct a new type of QA system based on recommendation.
Questions can be routed to highly appropriate users with such a system.
This chapter will discuss classic and current research in human motiva-
tion, along with properties of desirable system contributors. This is followed
by a section on related work concerning user modeling. This chapter concludes
with sections on current recommendation and incentive mechanisms, specif-
ically as they apply to QA systems. Examples are drawn from the current
state-of-the-art in question and answer systems.
2.1 Motivation
An incentive mechanism requires an incentive. That is, the core of
an incentive mechanism is something of perceived desire that is used to shape
behavior, or motivate. In psychology research, motivation is often divided into
two distinct categories: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic motivation is caused
by the pleasure of performing an activity [86], whereas extrinsic motivation
requires an expectation of something desirable from outside the performer.
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Psychologist Steven Reiss has stated that extrinsic motivation may be classified
as drives such as hunger, while intrinsic motivation is typically associated with
intellect, such as curiosity, autonomy, and play [68].
2.1.1 Extrinsic Motivation
Before we can understand what will motivate a person, or what a person
wants, we must understand his needs. In his 1943 seminal work, Abraham
Maslow defined a hierarchy of human needs [56]. Much research in motivation
is based on the satisfaction of these needs. The base needs are physiological and
safety needs, while the higher levels of belonging, esteem, and self-actualization
are most pertinent to QA systems. It is possible that people participate for a
sense of belonging to a community, but it is also likely that they are fulfilling
a need for esteem. This would include a need for confidence, achievement, and
respect by others. Sometimes this sense of fulfillment is enough to motivate
the users of a QA system to devote their entire time on a QA system toward
answering the questions of others while asking no questions of their own [83].
These esteem needs serve as an extrinsic motivator because they generally rely
on acceptance from others.
A more immediate type of extrinsic motivator would be to directly and
explicitly reward beneficial behavior. Prior to the proliferation of online com-
munities, much work has been done in the study of mail-in survey responses.
Public opinion and medical researchers have discovered numerous properties
that affect survey responses, and some are completely obvious such as survey
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length or monetary incentive, while others are more obscure, including com-
memorative versus ordinary stamps and colored ink [24] [6]. These studies
indicate a positive correlation between survey respondents and specific extrin-
sic rewards.
A simple effective extrinsic reward is a monetary incentive. Mizes,
Fleece, and Roos have shown that monetary incentives increase response rate
while biasing response rates little [58]. More surprisingly, they have also shown
that larger incentives do not necessarily increase the response rate [58]. It has
also been shown that if a monetary reward is offered, it must be made clear
to the responder during the first time of contact for greatest impact [11].
Monetary incentives have been applied to online QA systems. The now
defunct Google Answers was the first, while Uclue, Mahalo Answers, TaskCN,
and others continue today [14] [38] [79] [87]. These services sometimes charge
a small upfront fee for asking a question, then the questioner can offer up
to $400 for an acceptable answer. Typically the service will claim a percent-
age of this answer fee. While such a model can sustain a business given the
right audience, the fees also create a barrier to participation. Yahoo! An-
swers contains over 1 billion questions and answers [77], and its free service
model has certainly contributed to its widespread adoption. Yang et al. have
observed on taskCN that of 1.7 million users, only 3.2% have ever won [87].
Additionally, expertise has little to do with who wins the rewards; winning is
based almost entirely on competition level. Those who win rewards adopt a
strategy of specifically targeting only the most unpopular questions, regardless
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of content [87]. Moreover, recent research by Chen et al. shows that higher
prices for answers leads to significantly longer but not better answers [17].
Additionally they stress the importance of reputation systems through their
observations that a responder with a higher reputation provides significantly
better answers. This concept of modeling users is integral to the QA system
proposed here and will be further explained in chapter 4.
Non-monetary extrinsic rewards are the most common type of moti-
vator in QA systems today. Such rewards have also been investigated in the
context of mail-in survey responses. Church has observed that non-monetary
rewards yield a comparable response to monetary rewards, and the timing of
the reward (upfront or conditional on completion) has a much greater effect
than the reward type [18]. Nederhof has investigated non-monetary rewards
for survey participation and found that a simple ball-point pen dramatically
increases user response when the response rate is small [62]. Subsequent mail-
ings without an incentive converge toward the control rate. Interestingly, the
effects of giving a token non-monetary incentive dwindle as the response rate
increases. This is highly applicable to the standard bulletin board model for
QA systems. In theory, each of the millions of users can respond to all of
the millions of questions. In practice each user provides a total of 3.3 an-
swers [51], meaning Yahoo! Answers has an extraordinarily low response rate,
despite confounding variables such as practicality and readership. This would
indicate that non-monetary extrinsic rewards are appropriate for encouraging
participation in QA.
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Table 2.1: Yahoo! Answers reward structure
Action Points
Begin participating on Yahoo! Answers One time: 100
Ask a question -5
Choose a best answer for your question 3
No best answer was selected by voters Points Returned: 5
Answer a question 2
Deleting an answer -2
Log in to Yahoo! Answers Once daily: 1
Vote for a best answer 1
Vote for No best answer 0
Your answer selected as best 10
Receive a thumbs up on a best answer 1 per, max 50
Question removed due to violation -10
The most popular QA site, Yahoo! Answers (YA), relies on such a
system of extrinsic non-monetary rewards [77]. As the market leader, many
other sites have emulated the point based incentive system found on YA. Some
fundamental criticisms of these incentive systems are that points have no real
world value, they cannot be traded, and they simply indicate the activity level
of a participant. The only value that such points may have is esteem based,
or simply put, bragging rights. A fundamental benefit of the work in this
research is that points matter. Section 2.1.3 introduces the motivation behind
the proposed incentive mechanism, which is further described in chapter 5.
Many different techniques exist for quantifying the value of a contrib-
utor. Table 2.1 describes the reward structure currently used in Yahoo! An-
swers [39]. Jain, Chen, and Parkes have proven that the best answer voting
rule in YA is theoretically sound; that is, it effectively rewards beneficial behav-
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ior [40]. However, they have identified two different scoring rules that improve
the efficiency of the game equilibrium. Even if the rules are theoretically cor-
rect and optimal, they are still used to distribute points that have no value.
Experts-Exchange (EE) is a rare exception to this rule. EE awards points for
answering questions, and points can be redeemed for membership [37], which
can also be purchased. Membership allows a user to ask questions to others,
so this privilege is a form of non-monetary extrinsic reward.
2.1.2 Intrinsic Motivation
In contrast to extrinsic motivation, intrinsic motivation is driven by
needs or desires that come from within. The highest level of Maslow’s need
hierarchy, self-actualization, can become a strong motivator for QA users. This
level includes the need for creativity and problem solving [56]. These needs
on the self-actualization level often serve as intrinsic motivators because they
originate from within, whereas the lower levels serve as extrinsic motivators
because they rely on acceptance from others or other forms of reciprocity.
There is strong evidence against the existence of a strict needs hierar-
chy [82], but the classification of needs remains useful and relevant to modern
motivation research. Reiss has developed a listing of sixteen basic desires,
and the intrinsic, intellectual desires are most interesting in the context of QA
systems [68]. Some of these basic desires include curiosity, idealism, indepen-
dence, and power. It is easy to imagine a situation where one or more of these
desires may drive a person to participate in an online community.
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The fundamental identifier of intrinsic motivation is that the task itself
is rewarding. A simple example of intrinsic motivation is a person playing a
game. He usually expects no reward other than the enjoyment that is provided
by participating in the game. While this may seem unproductive, games have
been created in which the player contributes a useful service to others. One
class of games, called Games With a Purpose (GWAP), enables people, as
a side effect of playing, to perform tasks that computers cannot [81]. Some
examples of such tasks that people may find enjoyable include image tagging,
audio tagging, and ontology creation.
Intrinsic motivation is very pertinent to designing a question and an-
swer system. If participation yields its own rewards, participants will be more
likely to return. These intrinsic rewards are manifested in a sense of achieve-
ment. In fact, it is likely that some of the most desirable experts are motivated
intrinsically. Smith has discussed that many of the most successful responders
in Yahoo! Answers spend an average of several hours per day answering ques-
tions, without ever asking a single one [83]. Because the tangible value of the
extrinsic reward structure of Yahoo! Answers is minimal (see Table 2.1), it
can be assumed that these most prolific experts are motivated intrinsically.
2.1.3 Motivating Q&A
Both intrinsic and extrinsic motivators can be enormously useful in
eliciting participation in a QA system. People respond differently to differ-
ent stimuli, so it behooves a system designer to address the broadest possible
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population. The most valuable experts, those who spend hours daily giving
high quality answers, are an elusive group [83]. Instead of focusing solely on
this group, who most likely are motivated intrinsically, this research attempts
to cast a wide net and encourage participation from those who respond to a
wider variety of motivators. This research addresses both intrinsic and extrin-
sic motivation for participating in QA systems.
The agent-driven recommendation based QA architecture is designed
to function as an intrinsic motivator. The goal of this architecture is to trans-
form the process of answering questions into a fun, enjoyable challenge. The
recommendation of potential questions to answer streamlines the mundane op-
erations of searching for a suitable question and evaluating if it is worth the
time needed to answer correctly. From a questioner perspective, confidence in
a prompt, satisfactory answer can increase the enjoyment of participating in
such a system. While the desirable properties of the answers themselves form
an extrinsic motivator, the enjoyable process of participating in the system
yields intrinsic rewards. The recommendation process described in section 4.1
is designed to appeal to intrinsic motivation. One current QA system, Aard-
vark, leverages intrinsic motivation by using a recommendation system for con-
necting questioners to responders [1]. In Aardvark, responders are matched to
questioners by analyzing the question and searching through friends’ profiles
on a social network to find a match. Blurtit is a QA system that also utilizes
an intrinsic motivator; simplicity. While the incentive structure is not funda-
mentally different from its competitors, Blurtit is designed to have minimal
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barriers to entry by not requiring registration and limiting questions to 20
words [12].
This research takes a more pragmatic stance on extrinsic motivation.
At its core, the incentive mechanism relies on the following assumption:
A user will be motivated to answer the questions of others if he can
be assured of more satisfactory answers to his own questions.
This assumption is based on the concept that everyone knows something, and
nobody knows everything. Even the most accomplished and knowledgeable
people will have questions outside of their own area(s) of expertise. This idea
of eliciting a satisfactory response in return for participation creates an extrin-
sic reward structure. Through the principle of reciprocity, a participant ex-
pects something desirable from another in exchange for providing satisfactory
answers. This mechanism for evaluating and distributing extrinsic rewards, or
influence, is further described in chapter 5.
Such an approach toward extrinsic motivation has been successful in
peer production based projects such as software development. Peer produc-
tion is a method of solving problems where individuals who have the best
information available about their own fitness for a task can self-identify for
the task [8]. One such project is the development of the Linux operating
system. The project has been enormously successful, due in large part to
a team of highly skilled and motivated volunteer developers. Kollock posits
that their motivation for creating digital public goods stems from anticipated
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reciprocity [47]. He states that one may contribute to the group with the ex-
pectation that others will do the same, creating a generalized exchange and
system of credit where one can draw upon the effort of others without the need
to immediately reciprocate [47]. Not all peer production systems are entirely
benevolent; Pouwelse et al. explain that many systems contain “pirates and
Samaritans” [66]. Pirates may add value by illegally sharing content at the ex-
pense of the content creators. Nevertheless, Kollock shows that using a relaxed
accounting strategy that allows for some slack in repaying debts has many ad-
vantages that outweigh the increased vulnerability to exploitation, including
the ability to dampen cycles of recrimination, especially when interacting with
a subset of known individuals [48]. This is relevant to the proposed QA system
for several reasons. First, in the proposed QA system it is not necessary to
build credit before asking a question. Anyone can ask even the most difficult
question regardless of their past participation. Secondly, giving a poor an-
swer does not appreciably hurt a responder’s status. The system is designed
this way to encourage maximum participation. Additionally, Kollock stresses
the importance of identity persistence and reputation [47]. Persistence is nec-
essary for reciprocity to take place. Without a stable body of users, there
is temptation to take advantage of the system because there is little lasting
consequence. The proposed system is designed to facilitate reciprocity while
maintaining identity and reputation.
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2.2 User Modeling
The beginning of this chapter has been devoted to identifying potential
motivators and characterizing desired participants in a recommendation-based
question and answer system. Once this idealized target is known, it is necessary
to select individuals from the pool of active participants that match this ideal
most closely and incentivize them. This involves modeling each participant in
terms of their relevant traits, such as expertise breadth and depth, along with
their QA participation habits. Moreover, a recommender-based QA system
requires user expertise models in order to manage the recommendation of
questions to users and potential responders to questioners. Such modeling
techniques are fundamentally based on the concept of trust.
Many popular QA systems model users, but they rely simply on par-
ticipation metrics. Yahoo! Answers models users as a single integer, which is
the sum number of points they have earned [39]. Aardvark is an exception,
and it creates more sophisticated models based on user information stored in
social networking websites [1]. Like Aardvark, the QA system developed in
this research models the capabilities of its users in an expertise model. Unlike
Aardvark, it uses trust based modeling techniques to discover breadth and
depth of expertise across all topics.
2.2.1 Trust
Trust is a term that has many different meanings in different communi-
ties. In sociology, trust is a belief in the good character of one party [28]. The
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party is believed to seek to fulfill policies, ethical codes, and previous promises.
This definition of trust goes beyond the idea of confidence. Confidence is the
belief that a person or thing (or agent) is capable. An agent may be capable,
but still possess no benevolent intent. This concept of intent is a central tenet
of agent theory, and for this reason the agent research community has devel-
oped its own concept of trust. The concept of agent-based trust allows agents
to predict the behavior of their environment with known certainty. Often, as
presented here, trust has a statistical foundation.
Let E be an event, and let F be the set of properties that define the
event.
Event E
E ↔ [F = {f1, f2, . . . fx}]
An agent or team of agents can make a prediction of event E, called P . This
prediction has properties p1...px that approximate the properties of the event
E.
P = {p1, p2, . . . px} P ≈ F
max(trust) = min(∆(P, F )) (2.1)
Trust is a collection of techniques that allow an agent or team of agents to
minimize the error between P and F through observation of historic behavior
and communication. When an agent has the ability to predict the behavior of
its environment, it is more capable of achieving its goals.
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2.2.2 Multi-Dimensional Trust
Basic trust is used to simply minimize the ∆ between actual and pre-
dicted system behaviors. Multi-dimensional trust (MDT) is a richer variant of
basic trust in which an agent considers its goal state, as defined by its reward
function, and behaves in a manner to maximize its goal achievement and re-
sulting reward [31]. MDT is a technique for building trust models according
to multiple dimensions that are specified by a domain problem and conse-
quently an agent’s reward function. Gujral et al. have demonstrated that, in
many circumstances, MDT can be used to guide decision making resulting in
higher goal achievement [31]. In a sense, MDT is a more applied version of
basic trust. The MDT algorithm was developed to solve the partner selection
problem, where a rational agent is incapable of solving a problem in isolation;
therefore it will seek help from a potential partner agent. These agents are
guided by a utility function that attempts to maximize goal achievement. This
is analogous to a situation faced by humans in online question and answer sys-
tems. A questioner is incapable (or unwilling) to solve a problem alone and
therefore seeks assistance from a suitable other user. The MDT algorithm
below forms the foundation for expertise modeling and recommendation as
described in chapter 4.
There exists a rational agent, A, and a set of potential partner agents,
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P , with which the agent can interact.
A = rationalagent where A behaves according to a strategy
P = {p1, p2, ...pj}
where P is the set of all potential partner
agents, from p1 to pj
B = {b1, b2, ...bj} where B is the set of partner constraint func-
tions
∀pz ∈ P, ∃bz ∈ B each potential partner agent has its own con-
straint function
bz = {fz1, fz2, ...fzr}
Each constraint function, b, is a set of functions (constraints) that govern the
behavior of a potential partner z. These functions are expressed in the same
domain terms as the reward function. The partner constraints considered for
a QA system might include solution quality, timeliness, and availability.
R(f1, f2, . . . fs) = reward function
The reward function, R, is specified by the domain. The reward is a function
of the goal requirements fr, which are analogous to the partner constraints
bz, though not all partner constraints may be considered in the reward. This
reward function determines the amount of reward (measured in reward units)
earned by the rational agent A. The single subscript indicates that the reward
supplied is dependent only on the performance of the partner agent, not its
identity. In terms of a QA system, the reward represents the value of an answer
provided to a questioner. It is a function of several properties of the answer,
but the identity of the responder does not affect the value of the response. Let
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{gz1, gz2, ...gzr} represent the dimension components in the behavior model
of agent z. The following implication states that the number of dimension
components in a behavior model must match or exceed the number of goal
requirements for developing a generally applicable model.
[R(f1, f2, ...fs) ∧ (bz = {gz1, gz2, ...gzr})]⇒ (r ≥ s) (2.2)
In regards to QA, 2.2 states that the dimensions in the behavior model, r,
must include all relevant congruent properties, s, of a potential responder,
such as correctness, promptness, conciseness, and others.
The rational agent A maintains a model, b∗z, of the constraint function
bz for every potential partner agent pz ∈ P .
B∗ = {b∗1(n), b∗2(n), ...b∗j(n)} |B∗| = j where n ∈ N
∀pz ∈ P, ∃b∗z(n) ∈ B∗
∀[bz = {f1, f2, ...fr}]∃[b∗z(n) = {g1, g2, ...gr}]
The rational agent A maintains a set of behavior models, B∗, for every po-
tential partner agent in P . Each constraint function that defines a potential
partner’s behavior, fr, is approximated by a dimension component, gr, in the
behavior model. Because these models evolve, the subscript n indicates the
state of the model at time n. B∗ contains models, b∗z(n), of an individual
potential partner agent z at time n. The cardinality of B∗ is the number of
potential partner agents, j.
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This states that a rational agent maintains a model of the behaviors
of each potential partner agent. In a recommender-based QA system, exper-
tise models can be maintained by individual agents that represent a human
user or by a single centralized recommender (see chapter 3). With distributed
expertise models, many different models of the same entity are in use simulta-
neously. A simple scheme for propagating these models to maximize the social
benefit of shared experience under communication uncertainty is described
in [22]. While such a system of distributed expertise models is robust toward
system failures, the communication overhead for maintaining n2 models in a
QA system becomes impractical. Therefore, the proposed recommender-based
QA system uses a centralized system to model expertise, as described in chap-
ter 3.














b∗z(n) is the model of potential partner agent z at time n, and gzr is the
approximation of the constraint factor fzr for potential partner agent z. intz
is the number of observed interactions with agent z. This means that the
model gzr is simply the average of the observed values of fzr over all previous
interactions during time 1 to n − 1. This simple model updating scheme is
sufficient when trust is represented as a normalized collection of continuous
values and all interactions are equally weighted. The proposed QA system
uses a more sophisticated updating mechanism for expertise models based on
user feedback as described in chapter 4.
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In multi-dimensional trust, these models are used to maximize the re-
ward earned by an agent when selecting partners. The net reward earned by
the agent A when choosing a partner z, and z is available, is defined as:
reward = R(bz)− cf − czp
Where cf is the fixed cost of interacting with a partner, and czp, is the partner
cost constraint. czp can be considered a service charge levied by the partner z.
Therefore, the net reward earned by A is a function of the partner constraints
(behavior characteristics, bz) less an overhead cost and a service charge.
Agent A does not have direct access to the partner constraints, B,
necessary to make the optimal choice of partner agent, though A does know the
reward function R. In order to choose the best potential partner agent, agent
A must consult its partner behavior models, B∗, and construct an estimated
goal payoff (EGPz(n)) for each partner agent z at time n.
EGPz(n) = R(b
∗
z(n))− (1− az,est)cf − czp,est (2.4)
Where az,est is the estimated availability of the partner agent, and czp,est is the
estimated cost constraint. These estimates are calculated just like any partner
constraint function model g as shown above. Essentially, 2.4 is an expected
utility function that is used to calculate the predicted utility for choosing a
particular partner z at time n.
∃x < j|EGPx(n) ≥ EGPx̄(n)
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There is some potential partner agent x at time n that yields the greatest esti-
mated payoff for a given, known reward function. This agent is then selected
and the rational agent A receives the reward shown above.
This method of choosing a partner based on estimated performance
across many domain relevant factors is an application of multi-dimensional
trust. Often an agent cannot satisfactorily accomplish a task alone; it must
receive assistance, or in this example choose a partner agent. A technique
for teaming agents was originally developed in [31] for solving the partner
selection problem, and it serves as the foundation of expertise modeling for a
recommender-based QA system in this research.
One substantial difference from trust algorithms as presented here and
expertise modeling lies in the feedback mechanism. In basic trust, positive
interactions result in increased trustworthiness assessments [41]. Interactions
between agents are simply classified as a positive, negative, or neutral expe-
rience, and a single continuous value for trust is adjusted accordingly. With
multi-dimensional trust, the updating mechanism is based on goal achieve-
ment, which is a composite of a number of properties, such as interaction
quality, timeliness, et cetera. Like trust, an expertise model evolves with ex-
perience, but this evolution is guided by feedback concerning the quality of the
content, which in a QA system is comprised of both questions and answers.
This feedback is an evaluation of the worthiness or correctness of content
within the scope of the topic(s) it concerns and colored by the expertise model
of the evaluator. This feedback mechanism is further described in chapter 4.
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2.2.3 Trust in Social Networks
Social networks can be explicitly defined using friendship or linking
mechanisms, or they can be implicitly created, by users simply tracking the
identity of a content creator. User generated content (UGC) websites often
encourage users to formalize these networks of trust by providing various so-
cial networking features (contacts, follows, and friendships). These features
are designed to increase engagement and loyalty in this active user base and
to encourage the growth of the base in the long term. Due to these rea-
sons, UGC forums are also under online social networks (OSNs) as knowledge-
sharing oriented online social networks [32, 54] or content oriented social net-
works (COSNs). In the three primary activities users perform on OSNs, au-
thoring content, viewing content, and networking, COSNs are OSNs where the
emphasis is on authoring and viewing content. This is in contrast to network-
ing oriented social networks (NOSNs) such as Facebook, which are driven by
the users’ social relationships and networking activity. Thus, on a networking
oriented OSN, users will be most interested in information about their close
friends, while in a knowledge oriented OSN, a piece of information may have
intrinsic value (depending on its quality, relevance, etc.), independent of which
member introduces it to the group.
Often such UGC sites rely on a small set of highly loyal and productive
users whose actions interest the broader audience. Such users are the most
trustworthy users. Historically trust is defined as a measure of the truthfulness
or reliability of an agent [41]. In this research the most trustworthy agents
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are the users whose contributions to the community add the most value. The
social networks on these sites, while helpful in increasing user engagement and
allowing core users to quickly find information from sources they trust, can be
problematic. The formation of social networks can give rise to various social
phenomena such as nepotism, reciprocity, and cyber-balkanization [80], which
can distort the rating processes of the core set of users.
One source of trust, apart from personal experience, is reputation. Rep-
utation is an aggregate indicator of the trustworthiness of an agent as observed
by other agents. A good reputation score implies that an agent, or user, is
generally believed to be trustworthy. Barber and Kim explore this process of
belief revision based on this type of reputation in [7]. Online communities,
particularly general UGC websites, often have a large, sparsely connected user
base. The likelihood of one user A interacting with another particular user B
in a large system is very small, and often multiple interactions are necessary
to develop an accurate model of direct trust. Therefore it is impractical to rely
on direct interaction for a large part of their user base. Instead, such websites
rely on an aggregated reputation model from the community as a whole, or
“neighborhood reputation” [72], to identify valuable contributors.
Lerman et al. have investigated the spread of content in Digg and
Twitter and discovered that the most prolific users find and consume con-
tent through their social networks [52]. These users also provide the most
trust rating for reputation aggregation, hence their behavior patterns can be
extremely influential. Lerman’s work highlights the importance of social influ-
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ence in governing which content is promoted in UGC websites. Similar findings
have caused Digg to implement a policy where they discount endorsements,
“Diggs”, by users who are in the same social network as the original poster [70].
We argue that while social influence causes users to vote for their connections,
the opposite effect of homophily-based selection [19] needs to be taken into
account as well. It is possible that users add others to their social networks
because they like the content that they produce. In that case, discounting
all votes from a user’s social network connections could be misleading. In-
stead, we propose an approach based on estimating the user’s intent behind
his/her votes, instead of simply discounting all social contact based votes. In
[27], Ghosh and Lerman show that it is possible to predict which content will
flourish by examining the flow of that content through the social network in
its early stages. Alternatively, this research focuses on identifying valuable
contributors.
Building and trusting in others on an anonymous internet is difficult.
Often there is little consequence for antisocial behavior, and users behave in
a greedy manner. According to Resnick et al. effective trust and reputation
models require that entities are long-lived, feedback about current interactions
is captured and distributed, and past feedback guides buyer decisions [69].
UGC websites have the necessary infrastructure to address these points and
build meaningful reputation models. Users on UGC websites have a persistent
identity (their user names), and trust is established over time by observing
their actions. Another fortunate benefit of building trust models of users in
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UGC communities is the centralized nature of UGC websites. In contrast to
decentralized trust models as proposed by Yolum and Singh [88], the website
infrastructure of a UGC community monitors and aggregates every interaction.
Constructing reputation in this centralized fashion allows all users to access
the same reputation information for guiding their decisions.
According to Pavlov et al., a potential pitfall of reputation information
is that it may be provided in a strategic manner for numerous reasons including
reciprocation and retaliation [65]. Social networks suffer from a similar prob-
lem. Phenomena between users such as nepotism, reciprocity, and retaliation
can distort common measures of trustworthiness. To address this problem,
this research describes a mixture-model based approach that explicitly models
the behavioral aspects of interactions on a COSN as a component. The other
component of the mixture is expected to model the process by which users
assign unbiased ratings to high quality content. By estimating, for each user,
the likelihood of their behavior belonging to either component, the algorithm
attempts to identify users who indulge least in behavioral patterns that may
mislead a reputation system.
2.3 Recommendation
One purpose of building expertise models is to perform recommenda-
tion. Recommendation is the process of matching users to other users or
content. In the context of QA systems, recommendation is the process of
suggesting open questions to an appropriate responder. A straightforward
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recommender-based QA system design would assume that a question is sup-
plied, and the QA system must select potential responders from whom to solicit
responses. This selection process, or responder recommendation, is a signifi-
cant feature of the QA framework developed in this research. Recommendation
is a challenging and popular problem in the data mining and machine learning
communities, to the extent that Netflix offered a US$1M prize for an improved
movie recommender [9].
Identification of expertise is the first step in recommending a respon-
der. Expertise is defined as the ability of a user to answer a given question
to the satisfaction of the questioner. Given a question, how can the pool of
potential answerers be indexed and searched to predict who is capable of and
willing to provide an answer. Estimating which user is most likely to give a
satisfactory answer is a challenging problem and requires a complex model of
human expertise along: a) expertise dimensions: the various distinct areas of
human knowledge and the expert’s ability in each of these areas, b) compatibil-
ity: the likelihood that the answerer’s personality and approach to answering
questions matches that of the questioner, c) willingness: the probability that
the answerer will be willing to invest the time required to answer the question.
The expertise model is further defined in chapter 4.
Multi-dimensional models of expertise are crucial to the problem, as an
expert on one subject is not necessarily an expert on another, even when the
two areas are closely related. While question-answer systems already exist on
the web such as Yahoo! Answers and the defunct Google Answers, in most
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current implementations, there is only rudimentary modeling of user expertise,
and hence an expert is expected to wade through many questions until finding
one that is most suitable [14] [39]. Very specialized questions may never be
viewed by the few qualified experts, and the result is that only simple and
generic questions receive an answer. By automating the process of finding
an expert for a question, we remove the investment of time required by an
expert to find a suitable question, thereby reducing the cost of participation
and improve overall productivity.
Expertise discovery is fundamental to recommending the best respon-
ders. There are two sources of information from which to model expertise:
content-based and link-based [3]. Content-based expertise modeling analyzes
the word usage by responders in order to build a model of the responders’ ex-
pertise. This has been done in the context of clustering documents into topics
by Griffiths and Steyvers [71]. Additionally, Zhang et al. have developed the
QuME algorithm, which identifies expertise based on matching keywords [90].
Link-based expertise identification methods rely on evaluating the link struc-
ture between questioners and responders. Zhang et al. tested a number of
network based ranking algorithms on data from the Java Forum, showing that
link information can be used to identify expertise nearly as well as human
raters [89]. Jurczyk and Agichtein applied a variation of the HITS algorithm
to the much broader Yahoo! Answers data set and were able to identify au-
thoritative users, or expert responders [42][46]. The expertise model in this
work leverages both content and link information in order to best capture
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users’ expertise in a QA forum.
A number of different modeling and recommendation techniques have
been developed, but their application to QA has been limited. The GroupLens
research group has developed a movie recommender based on information fil-
tering and collaborative filtering agents [30]. Like the modeling approach in
this research, their technique combines content and user analysis to make rec-
ommendations. Recommendation often blurs the line between different fields
of research. While this research focuses on developing ways of selecting the
most appropriate people to answer a question, others use recommendation to
select answers from a large corpus of existing information, a process called
information extraction [59]. This is very closely related, but instead of eval-
uating the fitness of a user, the fitness of a piece of arbitrary text must be
evaluated. Like the proposed system, Andersen et al. have investigated trust-
based recommendation systems and have developed a technique for determin-
ing incentive compatibility based on fundamental axioms [5]. These examples
of recommenders illustrate the breadth of technology that can be applied to
QA recommendation.
2.4 Incentive Mechanisms
While expertise models are useful for recommending questions and in-
ducing suggested behavior, the incentive mechanism is used for rewarding ac-
tual observed beneficial behavior. These two techniques function as a push and
a pull serving as separate means toward the same end. An incentive mecha-
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nism is an algorithm that must encourage optimal system-wide behavior from
self-interested agents. According to David Parkes [64]:
The mechanism design problem is to implement an optimal system-
wide solution to a decentralized optimization problem with self-
interested agents with private information about their preferences
for different outcomes.
The proposed incentive mechanism is a collaborative aggregative sys-
tem. An aggregative system is based on explicitly rewarding certain behaviors,
while a collaborative system distributes rewards based on interactions between
users. The collaborative aggregative incentive mechanism combines the sim-
plicity and transparency of an aggregative system like that used in Yahoo!
Answers with the flexibility and power of a collaborative mechanism, like the
HITS algorithm [46]. Certain behaviors are rewarded, much like in Table 2.1,
but rewards are calculated based on answer feedback, which is weighted by
the influence of the reviewer.
The most interesting QA systems utilize incentives that bridge the gap
between content oriented social networks (COSN) and networking oriented so-
cial networks (NOSN) in order to expand their user base and retention. Quora
leverages real-world identities and reputation to attract users [20]. Users login
with their real name and are encouraged to provide professional experience
as an explicit listing of their credentials. This has lead to famous users from
the tech world ensuring an audience within Quora based on their real world
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reputations. These users carry authority and act as a magnet to attract more
people. Aardvark leverages social obligation in QA. Because people have an
existing personal relationship with others in their network, when they are rec-
ommended a question to answer they are obliged to answer it out of a sense
of social obligation. The responders know their work is going to directly help
someone from their social circle.
Regardless of why people are motivated to participate in online commu-
nities, the problem remains of evaluating the importance or significance of one
in a crowd. Search engines face this exact task, and Google uses a variant of
the PageRank algorithm [63]. In a rapidly evolving graph like a QA system the
normalized PageRank algorithm may be more appropriate for determining the
value of a participant [10]. Kleinberg’s HITS algorithm can be used to iden-
tify hubs and authorities in a network based solely on the link structure [46].
In addition to algorithms that are designed to calculate the importance of
network content based on connections, an incentive mechanism can be built
around techniques for ranking tournament participants [76]. Simply put, the
process of selecting the most valuable users and rewarding them accordingly
can be generalized across many domains. While the QA recommender relies
on creating accurate models based on trust, the incentive mechanism relies on




This chapter presents a novel architecture for questions and answer
(QA) systems based on recommendation of questions to potential responders
and a feedback driven incentive mechanism. A QA system is a prototypical
online community, and this serves as a concrete application domain for the
technology developed throughout this dissertation. Of the current major QA
systems on the internet, only Aardvark attempts recommendation [1], and
none have a non-trivial incentive mechanism based on non-monetary systemic
rewards.





Figure 3.1: Q&A architecture, user perspective
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Figure 3.1 shows the proposed architecture of a QA system from the
user perspective. Each human user has his or her own personal recommender
agent that automatically bridges the gap between users. A person must decide
whether to ask a new question, answer an existing open question, or search
the existing answered questions as a reference. The agent consults the QA
cloud and retrieves the appropriate content for the user. Not only does the
agent find appropriate content for the user’s expertise, it retrieves open ques-
tions for answering based on a utility function that maximizes the expected
reward earnings. This is further explained in Figure 3.2. Not shown on this
diagram is the option for a user to evaluate the contributions of others. A user
can endorse or denounce any content posted by another user, including both
questions and answers. This user interface architecture represents a significant
departure from the prototypical QA system, which uses a bulletin board style
interface with a large listing of loosely related questions. This recommenda-
tion paradigm is designed to reduce the amount of effort needed to search for a
question to answer based on question topic and potential reward. Along with
a tangible reward, this reduced effort is expected to yield higher participation.
3.2 Architecture - Agent Perspective
Figure 3.2 shows a more detailed view of the proposed QA system from
the perspective of a recommender agent. The agent is directly connected to
the user and is capable of leveraging every bit of content produced or con-












Topic Engine Incentive Calculator
Figure 3.2: Q&A architecture, agent perspective
each agent models only its own assigned user. Competition is introduced when
multiple users answer the same question. This is especially likely, and even
desirable, when high value questions are asked. Rather than each agent mod-
eling the capabilities of every user, the behaviors of outside users are captured
in a probability that the assigned user will correctly answer a question. This
is based on the topic of the question and the historical performance of the
assigned user in this topic. The topic distributions of questions and answers
alike are calculated by the Topic Engine, which is discussed further in section
4.1. The Incentive Calculator determines the amount of reward, or influence,
a user receives based on the value of a question, analysis of feedback concern-
ing responses, and user participation metrics. The mechanism that drives this
Incentive Calculator is further discussed in section 5.
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The recommendation agent is privy to the inner workings of the QA
cloud. The simplest query is a reference request, or a search of the existing
QA archive. Upon receiving this request, the agent will feed the query into
the Topic Engine to generate topic metadata, search the archive, and retrieve
content based on the words of the query along with the topic metadata. In
addition, the agent will log the topic of the request in the user model. The
purpose of logging reference requests is to capture what is interesting to the
user.
Handling a new question from the user is slightly more complicated.
The agent feeds the question through the Topic Engine, which calculates the
posterior probability of the question belonging to each topic given the words of
the question. This forms a probability mass function of topic membership for
the question, meaning the question belongs to topic A with a probability x and
topic B with a probability of y and so on. This concept of topic membership
is discussed in detail in section 4.1. In addition, the Incentive Calculator
calculates a question value based on the influence of the questioner. This
question, along with its topic membership meta-data and value metadata is
stored in the live QA database for others to answer. The design of the Incentive
Calculator is discussed in section 5.
This proposed architecture is designed to be very accommodating to
a user who wishes to respond to the questions of others. The user indicates
to the agent that he would like to answer a question, and the agent retrieves
questions that: 1) match the expertise of the user and 2) offer the highest
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expected rewards for the user. This is done by consulting the user model to
find topics of expertise, then searching the live QA database for open ques-
tions that match this expertise. The resulting questions are sorted in order of
expected earnings, and they are presented to the user. This saves the user’s
time by automatically suggesting questions that are targeted to the user’s ex-
pertise instead of requiring a user to search through many pages of questions
until finding an appropriate one. Moreover, this recommendation will serve
to maximize the expected reward of a user, thereby increasing his influence in
the system.
3.3 Architecture - Agent Decision Process
Figure 3.3 is a diagram showing the decision flow of the recommendation
agent. At the top of the diagram is the human user who is connected to the
agent. The shaded gray components are stages where the agent awaits input
from the user. As in Figure 3.1, the user must specify whether he intends to
ask a question, answer a question, or search for a reference question.
If a user wishes to reference a closed question, which is simply a question
which is no longer accepting new answers, the agent must analyze the query
for topic membership, search the QA archive, rank the resulting questions and
answers according to a match of interest and relevancy, retrieve them for the
user, and update the user model to reflect interest in the topic of the query.
This is shown in Figure 3.3 in the decision path where Query Type=Reference.
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Figure 3.3: Recommendation agent decision flow
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Topic Engine, which determines topic membership, and the Incentive Calcu-
lator, which determines the value of the question to a responder based on
questioner influence. This is shown in the decision path where Query Type =
Question. This question is then placed in the live QA repository while await-
ing responders. The user model for the questioner is then updated to reflect
interest in the topic of the question. Once other users have responded to a
question, the questioner has the opportunity to give feedback on the answers.
If the questioner is satisfied with one or more of the answers given, the question
is closed, and the rewards are calculated and distributed to the appropriate
responder(s). Also, the questioner is eligible to collect a small reward once
satisfied in order to encourage question closing. It is important to note that
the incentive mechanism is not a zero-sum game. That is, a questioner does
not spend his influence reward by rewarding others. This lack of influence
spending is designed to encourage an active community of participation, not
inhibit users from asking questions.
When a user chooses to answer a question, the agent must take several
steps as shown in the decision path where Query Type = Answer in Figure 3.3.
As explained above, the agent must first consult the user model, then retrieve
open questions that match the user’s topic(s) of expertise, and present them in
order of expected reward. Once the user has responded, the agent places the
responses in the repository to await feedback from both the original questioner
and from other viewers. The user can then collect the earned reward when
feedback is given.
54
This proposed architecture is designed to encourage participation and
foster user satisfaction in an online community by recommending appropriate
questions to answer and rewarding socially beneficial user behaviors. The
following chapters, 4 and 5, introduce techniques for evaluating trustworthiness
and expertise, making QA recommendations, and creating and distributing
participation incentives. These technologies govern the inner workings of the
Topic Engine and the Incentive Calculator. The architecture presented here
is given as an example of how these technologies can be combined to create
more productive online communities.
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Chapter 4
Identifying Experts and Recommending
Content
This chapter introduces techniques for identifying experts in a question
and answer (QA) system and evaluating the depth of expertise, or trustwor-
thiness, of users in content oriented social networks (COSNs). Section 4.1
describes the technical foundation of a topic-specific models of expertise in
QA systems. This section 4.1 describes a method originally developed by Bu-
dalakoti, DeAngelis, and Barber in [15] for modeling expertise and creating
QA recommendations. This is presented along with results demonstrating the
effectiveness of making recommendations on a static data set. Section 4.2 ex-
plains how to evaluate the trustworthiness or expertise of a user in a COSN,
specifically in a news aggregation online community. This section describes
and measures the performance of an algorithm for unbiased trust estimation
on COSNs developed by Budalakoti, DeAngelis, and Barber in [16]. This is
a difficult problem because social effects often overshadow the true value of
content created by a user. This section introduces an algorithm for evaluating
trust that is not biased by social effects.
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4.1 Expertise Modeling and Recommendation
The Topic Engine in Figure 3.2 is responsible for two tasks: expertise
modeling and question recommendation. Expertise modeling is a technique
for calculating the posterior probability of a body of text belonging to each
topic of expertise given the words in the text. In other words, the Topic
Engine can analyze text and classify it into abstract groupings of subject
matter. This is based on a higher level of abstraction called topics, which are
distributions over words. This classification of text enables the identification of
users’ areas of expertise and facilitates matching between content and users, or
recommendation. The technology behind this Topic Engine is an unsupervised
learning algorithm. Unsupervised learning means the individual topics are not
specified as in Yahoo! Answers, e.g. pets or sports [39]; topics are discovered.
This means that topics are created organically, with no human intervention,
allowing topics to evolve with the changing climate of the QA system.
In addition to expertise modeling, the Topic Engine is used for ques-
tion recommendation. An effective QA system must facilitate the sharing of
information. A question is provided by a user called a questioner, and any
other user (called a responder) is capable of reading this question and provid-
ing a response. In this dissertation research a question is supplied, and the QA
system must select potential responders from whom to solicit responses. This
selection process, or responder recommendation, is a significant contribution
of the proposed QA framework.
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4.1.1 Topic Engine Innovations
The Topic Engine contains two primary innovations that are required
for recommending questions to the users with the most appropriate expertise:
1. Expertise Model: Expertise is modeled in a QA system using higher level
concepts called expertise topics , which are associated with distributions
over words as well as users. These distributions are used to calculate the
probability of an author having relevant expertise given a question, and
these probabilities are used to make a recommendation according to a
decision-theory framework. This method captures the historical word us-
age as well as participation patterns for users. This dissertation proposes
a finite mixture based generative model to discover topics, and estimate
the parameters of the model using the expectation-maximization (EM)
algorithm.
2. Load Balancing Framework: A decision-theoretic framework has been
created for recommending expert participants, which tries to find satis-
factory responses for all questions without overloading any expert with
too many questions.
An alternative to the generative model discussed in 4.1.3.1 is to use
a standard clustering algorithm such as the k-means algorithm and identify
these clusters as topics. An even simpler alternative is to forgo the explicit
definition of expertise topics. This is accomplished by associating words with
authors based on historical usage and then recommending author responders
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based on the similarity between the words in the question and the responders’
word usage. This dissertation research intends to show that author-topic and
word-topic models for describing QA behavior lead to better responder rec-
ommendations than a traditional scheme of clustering words and authors into
topics or simple author-word counts. Experimental support for the generative
model approach to expertise modeling is given in section 4.1.7.
The proposed recommender currently adopts the questioner perspec-
tive and recommends the most appropriate expert responders to answer a
given question. It is possible to apply this same recommendation mechanism
to recommend a question of the appropriate topic to an idle responder. This
second approach to recommendation is the most appropriate way to match
open questions to available responders as shown in the user perspective archi-
tecture in Figure 3.1.
A second experiment supporting the recommender design demonstrates
the effectiveness of applying the proposed decision-theoretic framework to the
responder recommendation problem. This experiment is also presented in
section 4.1.7. Without the framework, it is possible to simply assign a question
to a topic and choose the most appropriate author according to the author-
topic distributions. This is called the best match technique. It is possible that
the best match technique will lead to undesirable system properties such as
the overloading of the most qualified experts with too many questions. The
decision-theoretic framework is designed to balance the responder load and
the satisfaction of the questioners when recommending questions, and this
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experiment will investigate its performance according to system-wide metrics.
4.1.2 Characterizing Recommendation
The proposed QA recommendation task addressed by the agent in the
architecture figure 3.2 can be described as follows: given a potential respon-
der, identify open questions concerning topics that pertain to the responder’s
expertise.
Verification of the modeling and recommendation algorithms has been
done using static data, which requires an analogous form of recommendation:
given a question by a user on a QA forum, identify users on the forum that
are most capable of providing a satisfactory answer to the question. Previous
historical information about interactions on the QA forum is required to train
the system.
More specifically, this research assumes that the training data is avail-
able to the Topic Engine in the form of individual question-answers (QAs),
and for each QA, the following information is available: a) a unique ques-
tioner id, b) text of the question, c) ids of all responders, d) the text of each
responder’s response, and e) some information indicating which answers were
found satisfactory by the questioner. Then, in the test step, the identity of
the questioner and the text of the question are given. The task is to suggest
suitable responders for the question. Then the actual responders are revealed,
along with the text of their answers.
In the case of a live test, it is possible to directly contact the suggested
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responders to judge their interest in the question. However, current system
tests are performed using historical data derived from QA forums. In this
case, recommendation quality is judged by how many of the recommended
responders had originally answered the question.
4.1.3 Expertise Modeling for Recommendation
Most approaches to the recommendation problem can be divided into
two categories: a) content-based filtering, and b) collaborative filtering. In
content-based filtering, users are modeled based on what they have been inter-
ested in, or liked, in the past. In collaborative filtering, new recommendations
are made to a user based on the interests of other users identified as most
similar to them. In the QA forum setup, each responder supplies content in
the form of text of the questions he chose to answer, as well as the text used to
answer these questions. Also included is collaborative information about the
other responders that chose to answer the same question as the responder, as
well as the questioner.
A simple content-based approach to the expert recommendation prob-
lem would be to build a text-based profile, for example a term frequency
inverse document frequency (TFIDF) profile, for each responder. Then, when
the system receives a new question, the question text could be compared to all
the responder profiles using a similarity measure such as the cosine score, and
the responders with most similar profiles could be recommended the question.
This is a common approach with respect to expertise modeling and recom-
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mendation, taken by Zhang [90] and Godil [29].
However this simple approach, which treats the expertise identification
problem as a document retrieval problem, suffers from a serious drawback: an
expert is very different from a document in the sense the exact words used by a
responder are heavily contingent on the questions he/she chose to answer, and
do not cover all the information that a responder has, or the topic he/she may
be knowledgeable about. For this reason a simple text profile based approach
is not sufficient for the purpose of modeling human expertise.
To overcome this drawback, this research introduces an alternate ap-
proach to expertise modeling, which models user expertise in terms of topics,
instead of words. A topic can be seen as a higher-level concept over words,
and is modeled as a distribution over words. Hence, two questions may belong
to the same topic even though they may have no words in common. Similarly,
an expert may be recommended a question even though there is no match
in terms of profile words, if the question is judged as belonging to a topic
the expert is interested in. Two words that are synonymous will have similar
distributions over topics for two reasons. First, they are likely to co-occur in
the same document (question and corresponding answers). Secondly, they are
likely to co-occur with many of the same words.
The next section introduces a generative model for a collection of
question-answers in a QA system. Learning the parameters of this genera-
tive model enables the identification of topics of interest to various authors,
as well as topic-word distributions.
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4.1.3.1 Generative Model for a Q&A Dataset
A generative model originally developed by Budalakoti, DeAngelis, and
Barber in [15] is the heart of the expertise modeling algorithm that drives the
Topic Engine. The generative model is a way to characterize the formation
of questions and answers using statistical distributions. A basic outline of
a generative model for any online forum where people might gather for a
discussion or to exchange information can be constructed as follows: at each
timestep, a topic, which might have its own prior distribution, is generated
from a distribution over topics. Then, some (question) words are generated
related to the topic. The topic distribution may or may not be independent
of the original author of the post, depending on how closely people stick to
their topic(s) of interest. Following this, a set of responders is chosen from a
distribution, based on the topic, and each of these responders generates further
words. The words generated by the responders are related to the topic but
may or may not be seen as drawn from the same distribution as the topic. For
example, users may have strong personal opinions, or try to draw the discussion
in some favored direction. This might require modeling each user as having its
own word distribution for each topic, or the words as drawn from a mixture
distribution of the original topic distribution, and a word distribution related
to the user.
The model outlined above will be expensive to create due to the large
number of parameters involved. The model is simplified considerably, reducing
it to a finite mixture model in the process. These simplifications reduce the
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number of parameters considerably, while still providing important insight into
the dataset. The generative model is described below:
Assume that the number of unique words p, the number of topics |T |,
and the number of unique responders s is known in advance. Let the words be
labeled 1, . . . , p and the users 1, . . . , s, arbitrarily. At each timestep, a topic
t is generated from a multinomial distribution τ over topics, and a vector
~wq = {w1, . . . , wp} is generated, where wi, is the count of word labeled i
in the generated words. The words are generated from φt, a multinomial
distribution over words corresponding to topic t. Following this a responder
vector ~x = {x1, . . . , xs} is generated from θt, a multinomial distribution over
users for topic t, where xi is the number of times the user labeled i responded.
Each of the users in x in turn generates words based on the topic t. Here, a
simplifying assumption is made that the words generated by a responder as
part of the answer are drawn from the same distribution φt as the topic.
This assumption can be understood as saying that the words used in
the answer to a question by a responder depend only on the topic of the
question, and do not depend on any attributes of the responder. This is a
reasonable assumption in QA forums where factual information is exchanged
for the most part, or even in forums where personal opinions are expressed
but the vocabulary used does not differ very much from user to user. It may
not hold true in forums such as blogs or discussion forums, where responses
to topics are much longer and more personal, and people may have favorite
topics they might try to steer the topic toward. However, this level of model
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Figure 4.1: Generative model for a question answer recommender [15]
complexity is unlikely to be necessary for QA forums.
Figure 4.1 displays the generative model described above in plate no-
tation. The shaded variables are the observed variables, while the unshaded
variables are the hidden variables. The horizontally striped circle represents
the topic, which is unobservable. Also, α, β and γ are symmetric Dirichlet
priors, used for smoothing. Set α = β = γ = 1. The total number of words
and users generated for each question is assumed to be independent of τ , θ
and φ, and hence their randomness can be ignored in our discussion. Also,
since it is assumed that the words generated by the responders depend solely
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on the topic, the words generated by all responders can be written as a vector
~wr = {w1, . . . , wp}. Therefore ~w = ~wq + ~wr.
4.1.3.2 Learning Model Parameters
Figure 4.1 shows that the generative model is essentially a mixture
model with a finite number of components, where the number of components
is the number of expected topics in the dataset. Let the number of such
components/topics be g. Let the total number of unique QA interactions in
the dataset D be n, where the jth such interaction is referred to as dj. Then
there is associated with each dj a hidden vector zj of length g, where zij = 1
if dj is about topic i. Therefore ~θ = {θ1, . . . , θg}, ~φ = {φ1, . . . , φg}, and






zij{log τi + logP ( ~wj|θi) + log (P (~xj|φi)} (4.1)
The expectation maximization (EM) algorithm [23] is used to to esti-
mate the hidden variables zi, and the parameters τ and ε. The derivation of
the EM algorithm for the model is fairly straightforward. The Expectation
(E) and Maximization (M) steps are given below:
E-Step: Given a guess for τ and ε, the expected value of zij is given by:
zij =
τi · P ( ~wj, ~xj|εi)∑g
h=1 τh · P ( ~wj, ~xj|εh)
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Any evaluation of QA recommender systems needs to take into ac-
count the experience of users from both perspectives: as questioners and as
responders. As questioners, users would like highly satisfactory responses. As
responders, users would like not to be overloaded with too many questions, or
be recommended questions they are not interested in. In particular, if they
are high quality experts, there is a risk that they might be recommended too
many questions in a bid to provide satisfactory responses to questioners, which
might result in reduced participation from them.
Two new metrics, responder load and questioner satisfaction, measure
the quality of QA recommenders from both of these perspectives. Both of
these metrics are variations of precision and recall, metrics commonly used in
information retrieval [75] and recommender system research [74].
It is possible to define precision and recall for a user in a QA system
from two perspectives: as a questioner and as a responder. Therefore, four
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Table 4.1: Metrics table for responder x [15]




Not Recommended R−x N
−
x
Table 4.2: Metrics table for questioner x [15]




Not Recommended U−x I
−
x
metrics of interest can be defined. However, the action governing the quality
of all four metrics is the same: each time a new question is introduced in the
system, the recommender makes a decision to contact a subset of responders
in the system and recommend the question to them. The decision to answer
the question is made by each individual responder and cannot be controlled
by the recommender. The decision made by the recommender to recommend
a question has to take into account both the possible impact on questioner
metrics as well as responder metrics.
4.1.4.1 Responder Precision and Recall
Let all the participants in the QA forum be represented by X. Any
x ∈ X can be a questioner or a responder/answerer. Let the user x’s responder













Here, the right-hand-side terms are as defined in Table 4.1. Table 4.1 can be
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understood as follows: Rx implies that the responder x liked the question,
i.e., responded to the question. Nx means that the responder x did not like
the question. A superscript of + means the recommender system suggested
the question to the responder x. A superscript of − suggests that it did not
suggest the question to the responder. For example, R+x is a count of the
number of questions that are both liked by responder x and recommended to
x.
For a given responder, responder precision is the ratio of the number of
questions that were recommended to a responder, that the responder answered,
to the total number of questions recommended to the responder. This is an
important measure of the quality of the recommender, as a recommender that
recommends too many irrelevant questions will drive away responders.
The recall for a responder measures what fraction of the questions the
responder answered were recommended by the system. It is a measure of how
well the recommender covers all the interests of the questioner, and while still
important, it is relatively less significant.
4.1.4.2 Questioner Precision and Recall
Similarly, let the user x’s questioner precision be written as πqx, and











Here the right-hand-terms are as defined in Table 4.2.
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Questioner precision measures how many of the responders recom-
mended by the system provided satisfactory answers. This is also relatively
unimportant: a user will not usually mind extra answers so long as he is
receiving a sufficient number of answers that are satisfactory. There may be
problems in extreme cases, such as when a particular user is spammed, but this
problem might be handled in other ways, such as allowing questioners to ban
specific responders from their questions, or rank answers based on responder
quality, or responder history.
Questioner recall measures how many of the answers/responders of in-
terest to the questioner the recommender was able to identify in advance. This
metric is more important than questioner precision because it indicates the de-
gree to which questioners can depend on the recommender to find the most
suited responders for a question.
Responder Precision and Questioner Recall are the focus of the rec-
ommender system tests. The next section presents some variant definition
of Responder Precision and Questioner Recall. These re-descriptions make
these metrics more intuitive to understand in terms of recommender system
behavior.
4.1.4.3 Responder Load and Questioner Satisfaction








The higher the value of λx, the greater the number of questions a responder
has to read through to find questions of interest. In that sense, it is a measure
of the load on the responder.









σx measures what fraction of the answers founds satisfactory by a questioner
were from responders contacted by the recommender. It can be seen as a mea-
sure of how satisfied questioners will be with the QA system if the responders
relied entirely on the recommender to provide them with interesting questions.





x∈X wxσx. wx could be set based on some individual user preferences
for load and satisfaction, or set as 1|X| , to get the average values. In the
experiments presented here, there is a tradeoff between λ and σ. For example,
by recommending all responders in the system, the satisfaction σx is fixed
to 1 for all questioners. However, this will have an adverse impact on the
questioner load, as most of the questions suggested to a responder, he will
not find interesting. Hence, the basic challenge in the problem is to provide
quality answers to questioners without overloading the better experts among
responders and to manage this tradeoff in a reasonable way.
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4.1.5 Expected Utility







x −N+x ) + (σ̄U+x − U−x )) (4.4)
The utility function expresses the tradeoffs λ̄ and σ̄, which can be seen as the
tradeoff between responders and questioners. For example, setting λ̄ to 10
would suggest that the system is willing to tolerate 10 incorrect recommen-
dations for a single correct recommendation. In a system where experts are
paid, high values of λ̄ and σ̄ might be acceptable. On the other hand, in a
voluntary system where experts are generally busy, lower values of λ̄ and σ̄
might be a good idea. Two parameters λ̄ and σ̄ are used instead of one, in
order to effectively manage the tradeoff between questioners and responders.
This is discussed further in the next section.
4.1.6 Utility Based Recommendation
In this research, utility is a measure of the value of recommending a
particular user, or potential responder, relative to other users given a ques-
tion. A recommendation or a lack thereof is determined by calculating the
expected change in utility for that recommendation. Calculating the expected
change in utility requires an estimate of the availability and expertise of a user.
Definitions:
Availability: For a given agent/responder x, define its availability
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in a topic t, vtx, as the probability that the agent/responder will
answer any given question in topic t.
Expertise: For a given agent/responder x, define its expertise in a
topic t, etx, as the probability that the agent’s/responder’s answer
will be rated as satisfactory, given that the responder answers the
question. Assume that the rating provided by the questioner as
satisfactory/unsatisfactory does not depend on the questioner and
depends only on the quality of the answer.
Thus, for a given question from topic t, the probability that a user x
will answer the question is vtx, and the probability that he/she will answer the
question satisfactorily as vtx · etx.
Let there be a question asked by a questioner q. Then suppose the
recommender contacts/recommends responder a. If a answers the question,
R+a increases by 1. Hence Ua increases by λ̄. If a does not answer the question,
N+a increases by 1, and the overall utility of a, Ua, decreases by 1. Then the
expected change in utility Ua for responder a, if he/she is recommended a
question by user q, written as ∆E(U
(q,a)
a ), is given by:
∆E(U (q,a)a ) = λ̄va − (1− va)
= (λ̄+ 1)va − 1
Similarly, the expected change in utility for the questioner, ∆E(U
(q,a)
q ), can be
calculated:
∆E(U (q,a)q ) = σ̄vaea − (1− vaea)
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= (σ̄ + 1)vaea − 1
The overall expected change in utility can then be calculated as:
∆E(U (q,a)) = wa ·∆E(U (q,a)a ) + wq ·∆E(U (q,a)q ) (4.5)
Expanding this gives:
∆E(U (q,a)) = wa · ((λ̄+ 1)va − 1) + wq · ((σ̄ + 1)vaea − 1) (4.6)
The proposed recommendation approach can then be summed up as follows:
1. Given a question by questioner q: for each candidate responder a, esti-
mate va and ea.
2. Calculate ∆E(U (q,a)) based on these estimates of va and ea.
3. Recommend the question to all responders for whom ∆E(U (q,a)) is pos-
itive.
4.1.7 Modeling and Recommendation Experiments
Experiments originally presented in [15] demonstrate a working imple-
mentation of the recommender based QA framework. 5000 questions and their
answers from each of three different subject categories in Yahoo! Answers
have been crawled, parsed, and processed. These categories are Astronomy
and Space, Books and Authors, and Wrestling. The collected data represents
approximately one month of activity within each category. These categories
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were chosen to represent a broad spectrum of the type of content available
on Yahoo! Answers. After the pages were stripped of html, stemming and
stopping algorithms were applied to remove affixes and unimportant words.
The first experiment compares the effectiveness of three different meth-
ods of identifying and modeling expertise. The first method uses a basic infor-
mation retrieval (IR) algorithm that calculates the cosine similarity between
the words used by an author in historical QA data and the words contained in
a question. This is included as a baseline measurement. The second method
uses K-Means clustering [33] to group question-answer documents into clus-
ters. Users are then assigned a probability weight in each cluster based on
the fraction of questions answered in the cluster. Given a new question, users
are recommended based on the normalized weighted sum of the similarity of
the question to each cluster centroid, multiplied by the probability of response
(availability) of each user in the cluster.
The third method uses the proposed generative model to discover the
author-topic distributions. Given a new question, a probabilistic estimate is
made of the topic of the question, and responders are recommended based on
their marginalized probability of responding across all topics, using θ.
Expertise models are built on a training set of 4000 questions and an-
swers. The remaining 1000 questions and answers form the test set. For each
of these questions in the test set the decision-theory framework was applied
to calculate an estimated change in utility for each potential responder. The
values for wa and wq represent the historic prolificacy of the responder, or
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the normalized number of times that responder and answerer responded in
the past. Responders that are then recommended have an estimated positive
change in utility. The values for λ̄ and σ̄ are chosen to tune the recommender
performance. These values are chosen to encourage a large number of rec-
ommendations and therefore high questioner satisfaction at the expense of
responder load. The recommender performance is analyzed using the metrics
of responder load and questioner satisfaction. One more simple metric called
weak satisfaction indicates whether the recommender was able to select at least
one of the authors who actually responded. λ̄ and σ̄ have been selected to fix
responder load near 0.95. This value of responder load represents a moderately
high responder sensitivity to being overloaded. With a fixed load, it is easier to
compare the tradeoffs made when evaluating questioner satisfaction. Assume
that all actual responses are satisfactory. Yahoo! Answers collects best-answer
information that indicates the single most satisfactory answer. However, the
unpredictability of the dataset makes recommending the single most satisfac-
tory response difficult and also marking a single response as satisfactory does
not imply that all other responses were unsatisfactory. Table 4.3 displays the
experimental parameters and results of an experiment to examine the impact
of expertise modeling on recommendation.
The second experiment compares the performance of a recommender
based on a decision-theoretic framework versus a very simple recommender
that makes recommendations based only on the strength of an expertise match,
neglecting the tradeoff between load and satisfaction. Table 4.4 contains the
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Table 4.3: Expertise modeling comparison [15]
Expertise Modeling Parameters Recommender Performance
Astronomy & Space Responder Load Questioner Satisfaction Weak Satisfaction
Info Retrieval λ̄ = 35 σ̄ = 20 0.9485 0.1187 0.3570
Clustering λ̄ = 50 σ̄ = 20 K = 30 0.9480 0.2682 0.6440
EM λ̄ = 250 σ̄ = 250 0.9559 0.2390 0.6567
Books & Authors Responder Load Questioner Satisfaction Weak Satisfaction
Info Retrieval λ̄ = 15 σ̄ = 5 0.9743 0.0186 0.1141
Clustering λ̄ = 35 σ̄ = 20 K = 15 0.9700 0.0079 0.0531
EM λ̄ = 200 σ̄ = 300 0.9701 0.0419 0.1722
Wrestling Responder Load Questioner Satisfaction Weak Satisfaction
Info Retrieval λ̄ = 25 σ̄ = 10 0.9740 0.0472 0.2472
Clustering λ̄ = 75 σ̄ = 100 K = 30 0.9748 0.2115 0.7050
EM λ̄ = 300 σ̄ = 200 0.9752 0.0922 0.4424
Table 4.4: Recommendation algorithm comparison [15]
Astronomy & Space Responder Load Questioner Satisfaction Weak Satisfaction
DT Framework (EM) λ̄ = 250 σ̄ = 250 0.9559 0.2390 0.6567
Best Match Top 25 0.9467 0.2102 0.6046
results of this comparison. The Best Match algorithm simply recommends
the top 25 responders according to the expertise information from the EM
algorithm. This is done to simulate a naive recommendation system that does
not use a decision-theoretic framework. These two experiments have been
performed to verify the design of the expertise modeling and recommendation
algorithms. These two algorithms serve in the Topic Engine as shown in Figure
3.2.
4.1.8 Recommendation Analysis
Yahoo! Answers is a noisy and unpredictable dataset. Over a set
of 5000 questions representing one month of activity in one category, 11588
unique users participated. Of these users, 4890 responded to a question only
once, and 4723 never responded to a single question, but only asked questions.
In addition, many users leave the system after a short period of time. 2319
new users appeared in the test data set of 1000 questions.
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Running an offline test of a recommender is very difficult. The results
show that the proposed system was able to correctly recommend at least one
responder more than half the time (weak questioner satisfaction) while main-
taining a load of λ < .95. This means that of every 20 recommendations
one user responded to the question. Given the bulletin board structure of
YA, it is certain that responders rarely see every available question. In a live
recommender test, a much higher percentage of responses from recommended
responders is predicted because it can be assumed that the responder sees the
question and knows it has been recommended based on his expertise. Also,
with a live test it would be possible to measure the questioner’s satisfaction
with any given response, leading to a more accurate measure of the recom-
mender performance regarding questioner satisfaction.
Table 4.3 contains the results of the first experiment. A responder load
of 0.95 indicates that of 20 questions recommended to a user, he responded
to one. This number is artificially high because this is a measurement us-
ing an offline test. The results show that the clustering and EM algorithms
outperform the basic information retrieval algorithm according to questioner
satisfaction in nearly every case. This evidence supports using more sophisti-
cated techniques for discovering responder expertise. The EM and clustering
algorithms performed very similarly across all three data sets. While recom-
mendation was more successful with some data sets, the relative performance
of the algorithms was preserved.
































Figure 4.2: Expertise modeling technology performance [15]
the decision-theory based method, and the second is a simple Best Match
algorithm. While this is just a single example, it shows that a more sophisti-
cated utility-based recommender can outperform a simple recommender, even
when they are supplied the same expertise information. The decision-theoretic
framework only slightly outperformed the simple best-match recommendation
algorithm. It is likely that interactive experiments run on a live dataset will
better demonstrate the load balancing features of the decision-theoretic frame-
work.
Figure 4.2 shows the performance of the three distinct expertise mod-
eling technologies across all three harvested data sets from Yahoo! Answers.
The performance metric is weak satisfaction / load, where weak satisfaction is
fraction of times at least one satisfactory answer is recommended to a ques-
79
tioner and load is the fraction of irrelevant questions recommended to an
expert, divided by the total number of questions recommended. A small load
value and a large value for weak satisfaction are desirable, so higher values
of weak satisfaction / load are preferred. From this figure it becomes clear
that the more sophisticated techniques of topic-based clustering and gener-
ative modeling outperform the simple information retrieval approach. The
two more advanced techniques performed comparably, but it is suspected that
a richer data set will reveal additional performance gains by the generative
model approach because this approach can leverage the power of author-topic
and word-topic models instead of simply defining topics as clusters of words.
4.1.9 Recommendation Discussion
An expertise model and recommender for selecting the most appropri-
ate responders given a question has been developed. This technology forms
the core Topic Engine in a question and answer forum under development that
is designed to encourage expert participation. The two primary components
of this work are: 1) a finite mixture model based approach for characteriz-
ing the production of content in an online question and answer forum and
2) a decision-theoretic framework for recommending expert participants while
maintaining questioner satisfaction and distributing responder load. The gen-
erative model uses word content information and collaborative information
to build models of users’ expertise that are employed during recommenda-
tion. Two new metrics have also been developed: responder load and ques-
80
tioner satisfaction. These metrics are used to evaluate the performance of the
proposed recommender system on datasets harvested from Yahoo! Answers.
Three methods of constructing expertise models are compared: a simple in-
formation retrieval approach, clustering words to discover their distribution
over topics, and expectation maximization based on the generative model. In
addition the decision-theoretic based recommender is compared to a simple
best-match configuration. Experiments across several topic domains demon-
strate the proposed system’s ability to predict responder identities and suggest
new responders.
These expertise modeling and recommendation techniques form the
core of the Topic Engine in the proposed QA system architecture. These
techniques allow the matching of questions to responders and consequently,
responders to questions. This form of recommendation lowers the time invest-
ment needed by a user and bolsters questioners’ confidence in the answers of
others and therefore encourages more participation from the user base. The
Incentive Calculator in Figure 3.2 also attempts to encourage participation,
but it utilizes a system of non-monetary extrinsic rewards.
4.2 Unbiased Trust Evaluation in Social Networks
Online communities based on user generated content (UGC) often rely
on a small set of highly loyal and productive users to identify or create content
that would interest their broader audience. Through continual contact, this
user base often develops informal reputational and social ties among them-
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selves. Websites often encourage the formalization of these trust networks by
providing various social networking features to increase engagement and loy-
alty. A user may come to trust a subset of the others as a consistent source of
good content, while avoiding the remainder, leading to influence-based frag-
mentation. This section investigates the impact that these emergent social
behaviors can have on the quality of reputation scores and develops algorithms
that are able to take them into account while calculating user reputation. This
section describes a method for evaluating trustworthiness that was originally
developed by Budalakoti, DeAngelis, and Barber in [16].
4.2.1 Social Biases in Online Communities
The two key roles on a UGC forum (or COSN) are that of content
creators, users who create content with the expectation that it may interest
others, and users who consume the content. The two roles are not mutually
exclusive; the same user may be a content creator or consumer at different
times, depending on the circumstances. There are many ways in which con-
sumers may express their opinion of a piece of content: the very fact that the
consumer accessed the content (by say, clicking on a link to it) can be seen as
a positive affirmation. Also, many websites provide ways by which users can
express their approval, for example, by ‘upvote’ links for users to click. We
call any such action by which a content consumer may express their approval
of content as a selection.
A selection can be seen as a vote of confidence in the quality of content
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produced by the content creator, and the total count of selections can provide
a good initial estimate of the quality of a user’s content, or a user’s reputation.
One problem with this approach is that all users are not equally good judges of
quality: some users may be more qualified, or they may be more involved in the
forum, and thus have a better understanding of the goals and ‘personality’ of
the forum. A more advanced approach would be to weight selections by some
measure of the selecting users’ reputation in the forum, an approach that
might yield an algorithm similar to eigentrust [44], proposed for reputation
estimation in peer-to-peer networks.
Another important problem is that, even in the case of users who may
be highly reputed on a forum, the motivations behind a selection they made is
not always clear. The reason for this is the social aspect of UGC forums: over
time users develop social relationships with other users, and these relationships
impact choices about the content they consume or favor. As UGC forums rely
on these users to select content of general interest, incorporating these biases
while identifying content of general interest can adversely affect the selection
quality. Some documented examples of such biases are:
1. Reciprocity : A common social norm on many forums is for users to
provide a reciprocal link in response to a link. This norm can be seen as
a form of courtesy, but is also exploited by some users to increase their
link count. Reciprocity of links is a well-documented phenomenon on
the websites Flickr [50] and Twitter [85].
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2. Social Voting : Many content-sharing sites such as Digg and Yahoo! An-
swers allow users to add other users as contacts or friends. The aim is
to increase engagement: the site is designed so that users find it easy
to get updates on the activities of their contacts. A side-effect is that
since users find interesting stories via their contacts, users with many
contacts find it much easier to promote their content. Social voting has
been documented on the website Digg [27] as well as Flickr [53].
In other words, the reputation that users aggregate over time does not
depend only on their quality, but also on many behavioral side-effects of their
social network interactions. In this section, a mixture model is developed
that assumes that a user’s rating behavior could be driven by one of two
intents/motivations:
1. Content Quality : The responder’s expertise in a topic determines the
quality of the content produced by him/her. A selection based on con-
tent quality recognizes the content creator’s authority and should be
considered when estimating his/her reputation.
2. Social Affinity : The social affinity between a content creator and pro-
ducer is independent of the content quality and depends on their re-
lationship with each other, which may be observed or modeled, given
information about their online social network links.
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4.2.2 User Reputation in COSNs
A natural way to define a user’s reputation in a UGC forum is the
number of times content created by him/her has been selected, or rated pos-
itively, by another user. A more sophisticated approach would be to weigh
each selection by the reputation of the user making that selection.
Then, let the reputation (or authority) of user i in a topic be written
as ri and the number of times user j selected content by user i, rji. Let NS be








where N is the number of users. Now, let the number of ratings by user j be
written as qj. Then, after normalizing with the total reputation of all users in
the system, we can rewrite ri as follows:
ri =
∑N
j=1 qj · rj · pji∑N
j=1 qj · rj
(4.8)
where pji is the fraction of content by i selected by j. Dividing both numerator















as the probability that user j will provide a rating, written as
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4.2.2.1 Absorbing Random Walk Interpretation
Equation 4.10 can be written in matrix form: let Q be a diagonal
matrix, where Q(i, i) = P qi , let P be a matrix such that P (j, i) = pji, and let
r be a vector corresponding to ri...N above. Then the above equation can be
written as:
(QP )T r = r (4.11)
Add a small uniform prior probability matrix ezT to P , where ei = 1
for all i, and z sums to 1. This signifies a small probability that any user
can select any other user, even with no current evidence in the data. Adding
1 to the denominators of Q(i, i) preserves a probabilistic interpretation. A
restriction that r sum to 1 can be added. Then the above equation can be
rewritten as:
(QP + ezT )
T
r = r (4.12)
Solving this gives
r = (I −QP )−T z (4.13)
Let T = QP . Then1 r = (I − T )−T z. As all rows of matrix T sum to less than
1In practice, the inverse need not be calculated, but r can be calculated by solving the
set of equations using Gaussian elimination, based on T and z.
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1, T can be interpreted as the transition matrix for a reducible Markov chain
with N + 1 states by adding an extra recurrent absorbing state, which is the
exit state. At any timestep, if the system is currently in state i, it transitions
to the exit state with a probability 1 − Q(i, i), and to another state j with
probability Q(i, i)×Pij. Then R = (I − T )−1 is the definition of fundamental
matrix of an absorbing Markov chain, that is R = I +
∑∞
i=1 T
i [45]. So, if
a random walk is executed across the absorbing chain, Rij is the expected
number of visits to state j before exit, if the walk started in state i. As z is a
probability vector, r = RT z gives the expected time spent in each state, if the
initialization probability of the walk at vertex i is given by zi.
4.2.2.2 Relationship to Eigentrust
PageRank[13] is a popular algorithm for link analysis over a collection
of hyperlinked documents. A variation of PageRank, called eigentrust [44],
was proposed by Kamvar et al. to estimate user reputation in P2P networks.
Applying the eigentrust formulation to the problem here would define user
reputation as:
((1− c)P + cezT )T r = r′ (4.14)
where c is a parameter, called the teleportation probability, and usually set
to 0.85. The common approach to solving this equation is via an iterative
method. However, solving algebraically, as described in [34] gives:
⇒ r′ = (1− c)(I − cP )−T z (4.15)
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Comparing equations (4.13) and (4.15), we see that r and r′ differ only
by a constant, (1 − c). So (4.13) provides a generalization of the PageRank
vector: r = r′ when Q(i, i) = c for all i, that is, when all users are weighted
equally, irrespective of the number of ratings provided.
One intuitive interpretation of PageRank in the context of webpages is
the random surfer model: intuitively, a webpage’s authority is estimated as the
probability that a random web surfer would visit the page given that he/she
starts at a random page and selects a random outlink at each timestep. The
vector r can be understood in terms of the random surfer model as follows: in
PageRank, there is a constant probability c with which a surfer gets bored at
any timestep and teleports to another random page. This seems reasonable
for webpages, where the number of links provided may have little relationship
to the quality of the page, but for UGC forums, more active raters are more
likely to be seriously interested in the forum and likely to be better judges of
content quality. In our formulation, the probability of random teleportation
varies inversely with the number of ratings provided by the user. It would be
useful to have this effect level off at some point, so that users cannot increase
their influence as content creators simply by evaluating heaps of content. For
this reason we use a sigmoid function to set Q. We set Q(i, i) = 1
1+e−0.05qj
. This
means that for questioners who have provided 100 or more ratings, Q(i, i) is
effectively equal to 1.
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4.2.3 Mixture Model Based Reputation Estimation
Raters’ fairness or objectivity is supposed to estimate the degree to
which their ratings are motivated by the quality of the content rated, as op-
posed to the influence their social network has on them. Define a hidden
variable vector objectivity o, where oi is a measure of the degree to which
rater i is fair with the ratings he/she provides. For raters motivated by con-
tent quality, oi = 1, and for raters completely driven by their social network,
oi = 0. We make the simplifying assumption that all of a rater’s selections are
driven by one of the two motivations. As part of the reputation estimation
algorithm, we estimate the probability that oi = 1 for each user i. To estimate
oi, we model a rater’s behavior as follows: the number of ratings qj each user
provides is drawn from a distribution (this distribution need not be modeled as
part of the final algorithm). Each user also has a hidden variable oi associated
with him/her. Following this, for qj timesteps, depending on the value of oi,
the user i draws values from one of two distributions: the quality distribution
(if oi = 1) and his/her personal social affinity distribution (if oi = 0.) Let O
be a diagonal matrix where Oii is the estimated objectivity value of user i.
The quality distribution ρ is defined as follows: the user selects another
user at random, with the probability of user j being selected proportional to
their reputation rj. Essentially ρ is the same as the vector r, normalized. The
social affinity distribution σi for user i is defined as the user’s social network,
with all members equally likely; people who are not members are assigned
a small prior, to assure nonzero likelihood. We use another prior: the prior
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probability of selecting from the social affinity distribution defined for each
user, which is the number of times the user selected a poster, or content cre-
ator, from his/her social network, based on historical data. We refer to this
as the affinity prior π. Then given a set of selections, the posterior probabil-
ity of selecting from either of the two distributions can be calculated. The
quality distribution depends on O, as only users who are objective should be
considered while calculating ρ. However, re-estimating ρ changes the objec-
tivity values O for all users. An iterative expectation maximization based
algorithm has been chosen, where user objectivity and the quality distribution
are alternatively estimated.
4.2.4 Unbiased Trust Experimental Support
Experiments were conducted testing the trust algorithm on data from
the user generated content website Digg2. Along with Reddit3, Digg is cur-
rently one of the most used content aggregators. Digg maintains a rich, active
user community and contains the necessary components for trust estimation in
a content-oriented social network including: user generated content, a voting
and aggregation system, and a mechanism to link users into a social network.
Digg social network and endorsement data was obtained with permission from
Lerman et al. [52].





a) Initialize ~πi, the affinity prior probability for each user i.
b) Set ρ = (I −OQP )−T~z, where Q and ~z are initialized as
described in Section III.
c) Repeat Step 2 to 4.
Step 2: Objectivity Estimation
For each rater i in the dataset, and their ratings ~si = rij.
estimate oi =
(1−πi)P (~si|ρ)
(1−πi)P (~si|ρ)+πiP (~si|σi) .




i=1(1− oi) logP (~si|σi) + oi logP (~si|ρ),
where j is the current iteration number.
b) If LL(j) < LL(j−1), exit.
Step 4: Reputation Estimation
c) Set ρ = (I −OQP )−T~z.
Figure 4.3: Iterative algorithm for reputation estimation [16]
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each user submitted link (story) that made it to the front page we have ac-
cess to the identity of the story poster and the identity of each user who
‘diggs’ the link. Additionally, for each of these users we have access to the
single-directional link data, indicating that a user is ‘following’ another, thus
forming a social network. Each user has access to the activity of the users
he/she follows, so that when a user diggs a link, all users who follow him/her
are able to see this information. A significant portion of the votes on Digg
come from this process, where users find content that their friends have en-
dorsed, a process described as a ‘cascade effect’ [52]. These endorsements are
driven by a mixture of two classes of motivators: similarity-based and so-
cial influence-based. Similarity-based motivation occurs when a user follows
a content creator because of a preference for content by that content creator,
whereas social influence-based motivation occurs when a user endorses con-
tent from a creator because of a social relationship with that creator. Because
these motivations are mixed, it is difficult to identify users who submit pre-
ferred content from those who are merely socially influential.
The aim of the experiments is to test whether a mixture model based ap-
proach that attempts to model social interaction dynamics can identify users
relying unfairly on their social network influence to boost their reputation.
This is compared to a PageRank [13] based approach that does not take into
account any information about possible social motivations of voter endorse-
ments (diggs). It is expected that the algorithm will identify users who provide
better quality content. As a measure of content quality, we use the mean num-
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Figure 4.4: Fraction of user ranks predicted correctly by reputation algorithm
and PageRank [16]
ber of votes received by a user once their story is promoted to the front page,
because a large majority of votes for a front-page story come from the web-
site’s broader audience, making it difficult to rely on social affiliations. For
the experiments, we analyze, for each content creator/poster, the voting data
for each story they have posted until it receives 30 votes. This information is
used to calculate the reputation of each user using our mixture-model based
algorithm. The correlation of the reputation scores observed with the mean
number of votes received per story for each poster can be calculated, and this
is compared to a näıve PageRank based approach.
Table 4.5 shows the correlation coefficient values of the reputation and
PageRank scores of each story submitter with the total votes received by
his/her stories. The correlation is high in both cases but higher for the rep-
utation algorithm. Table 4.6 compares the averaged reputation and PageR-
ank scores (obtained by dividing reputation/PageRank scores with number of
submissions) with the mean votes received per submission. This is a better
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Table 4.5: Correlation: Reputation and PageRank scores vs submitter total
votes [16]
Correlation Coefficient
Reputation Mixture Model 0.895
PageRank 0.809
measure of a content creator’s quality than the aggregate number of votes,
as a user can be inconsistent in quality but still receive a large number of
votes in total if he/she submits a large number of stories. However, in this
case, the correlation is weaker. But the reputation algorithm still outperforms
PageRank in correlation.
To compare how well the two algorithms rank users by quality, the
scores provided by each of them are sorted in descending order and compared
to a ranking of posters by mean number of votes received. The comparison
is shown in Figure 4.4. The y-axis of the graph shows the fraction of users
in common between the ranking of users by mean vote per submission and
the ranking generated by the algorithm. The reputation algorithm identified
two of the top five ranked contributors, while the PageRank algorithm could
not identify any. However, both algorithms could identify only two of the top
ten. This is responsible for the initial drop in performance of the reputation
algorithm from a peak. Following this the reputation algorithm consistently
outperforms PageRank.
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Table 4.6: Correlation: Averaged reputation and PageRank scores vs submit-
ter mean votes per post [16]
Correlation Coefficient
Reputation Mixture Model 0.591
PageRank 0.484
4.2.5 Discussion
Content oriented social networks populated with user generated content
are growing in popularity and diversity. Many such networks rely on large
numbers of users who voluntarily generate content. This content draws in
other users and creates value for the site. It is important to be able to identify
the most valuable users and establish a level of trust in these users. This
trust can be harnessed in the form of reputation, which is a signal that can
be shared with others to drive decision making. Additionally, knowing the
valuable members of a community is useful for the system designers because
the designers can then implement strategies and incentive mechanisms to draw
more trustworthy users to a site.
Social effects often hinder the performance of existing reputation mech-
anisms in UGC communities. This work presents an algorithm that is not
biased by social effects and demonstrates the performance of modeling user
reputation in a COSN. The performance of the algorithm on UGC data from
Digg has been demonstrated, and the results are applicable to any content-
oriented social network relying on user generated content. While this section
is not specific to question and answer systems, this trust estimation technique
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can be applied to QA systems or any other community based on user generated
content.
4.3 Chapter Summary
The techniques presented in this chapter allow one to identify experts
and recommend content (section 4.1) in a question and answer system, and
also to evaluate the trustworthiness and expertise of users in a more general
context, regardless of social effects (section 4.2). These techniques form the
foundation of a new class of online communities because they allow us to
identify the most valuable contributors from a group of peers. Recall RQ1 in
section 1.2.1:
RQ 1: How can the expertise of a user in an online community be
measured?
The techniques presented in this chapter directly address this question of mea-
suring expertise in several types of online communities. Once these desired
contributors are identified and characterized, it is possible to develop incen-
tives to encourage their beneficial participation. Chapter 5 explains how such
an incentive mechanism is constructed. Referring back to the example archi-
tecture presented in chapter 3, section 4.1 details the inner workings of the
Topic Engine for building topic-specific models of expertise and recommending
content, and chapter 5 discusses the functionality of the Incentive Calculator.
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Chapter 5
Incentives For Online Communities
Chapter 5 describes the nature of incentive mechanisms, specifically in
question and answer (QA) systems and describes the design of a novel incentive
mechanism based on reciprocal systemic rewards. The Incentive Calculator in
Figure 3.2 is responsible for encouraging participation by allocating influence
points, or rewards. These points serve as a valuable reward due to the princi-
ple of reciprocity. The points themselves have no value, but a user possessing
a large number of points will be given priority when asking a question. This
forms a systemic reward, a reward that has value within in the context of the
system. Users can earn more influence by satisfactorily answering questions
from others with high influence. Game theory is relevant to the QA problem
because users do not always answer questions to the best of their ability, but
they are in competition for influence points, and they are typically rational
actors. Mechanism design is a particular field of game theory, originally de-
veloped for applications to economics. These applications include auctions,
markets, pricing strategies, and many others. Game theory traditionally fo-
cuses on careful observation and strategy surrounding the behavior of rational
agents in a given competitive game. Mechanism design can be considered a
form of reverse game theory; the game is designed to induce certain strategies
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and therefore certain outcomes. Like Parkes [64], Tuomas Sandholm defines
mechanism design as:
Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so
that a desirable outcome is reached despite the fact that each agent
acts in his own self-interest [73].
Each user, or rational agent, has a type (θ), which represents their full capa-
bilities and expertise. From their contributions to the QA system, we can see
their reported type, or θ̂. A social choice function maps the true type θ to an
outcome, whereas a mechanism maps the reported type θ̂ to an outcome. The
goal of mechanism design is to design a game that has an equilibrium state
that implements the social choice function. Therefore, it is imperative to fully
understand the desired outcome of a game before a mechanism can be created.
As stated in chapter 1, the desired outcome of the proposed QA system
is to increase user participation and satisfaction. The recommendation-based
QA architecture described in section 4.1 and the non-monetary extrinsic re-
ward based incentive mechanism are two complementary, yet independent,
technologies for pursuing this same goal. The most significant difference be-
tween these technologies is that expertise modeling and recommendation are
driven by Bayesian models of user generated content, while the incentive mech-
anism is based solely on user actions and human feedback regarding original
content. This distinction allows the automatic classification of user expertise
with no human specification or evaluation needed. This automated expertise
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classification is capable of capturing dynamic expertise evolution as a user
becomes more proficient in new topics. In contrast, it is desirable to harness
human feedback for the allocation of influence points. This human evaluation
leverages the wisdom of the crowd to solve the difficult task of evaluating re-
sponder content. Ultimately the entire purpose of a QA system is to provide
answers that satisfy the original questioner and provide value to the rest of
the community, and the best judges are people.
The purpose of an incentive mechanism is to pursue a desired outcome.
In the proposed QA system, the desired outcome is increased expert partici-
pation. This high level outcome can be deconstructed into more manageable
system goals. These are distinct from the goals of individuals. Individuals
would like their own questions answered promptly and satisfactorily, with lit-
tle regard for the questions of others. System goals concern the general welfare
of all users in the system.
Many smaller goals can support the overarching target goal of increased
expert participation and satisfaction stated in the hypothesis. Two primary
classes of behaviors are desired. The first and most obvious behaviors are ex-
pertise based. It is certainly preferable to elicit responses (and questions) from
users with a high level of expertise. Users who have more expertise in a topic
are more likely to provide satisfactory answers in that topic. The second class
of desirable behaviors concerns participation. Even if a user is not capable of
providing deep insightful answers to particular questions, there is still value
in contributing something. Imagine the case where an easy question has been
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asked. A user who frequently responds to questions on a very short notice but
perhaps without the greatest expertise will be able to solve this question effec-
tively and satisfy the questioner. The proposed QA system is designed around
the assumption that people have varying levels and areas of expertise, but ev-
eryone has something valuable to contribute. Therefore reward, or influence,
is based on both demonstrated expertise and participation. It is important to
note that the proposed mechanism, while based on influence points, does not
imply the creation of a market. Points cannot be spent. Asking a question,
even one that is rated poorly, does not remove points. This design decision
was made to encourage participation from all users, regardless of perceived
expertise.
These goals are expressed in a set of desired outcomes. A full under-
standing of the desired outcome is necessary in order to develop the rules that
form the incentive mechanism. The following is a list of desirable outcomes in
a QA system:
• Users are not penalized for asking a question or giving a poor answer.
• Satisfactorily answering a question yields a greater reward than unsatis-
factorily answering that question.
• Satisfactorily answering a question of higher value (asker has more in-
fluence) should yield higher rewards than answering a question of lower
value.
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• Users who answer very difficult questions should be rewarded for doing
so.
• Recently added users should be able to earn a meaningful amount of
influence in a reasonable time in order to compete with more established
users.
Some of these desired outcomes may sound counterintuitive, particu-
larly the first one. A user should not be penalized for asking a question because
part of the value of a QA system is having a rich corpus of questions and an-
swers readily accessible as a reference. Discouraging asking questions reduces
value for the questioner who is seeking answers and also for users who would
benefit from answering the question. Poor answers made in earnest should
also not be discouraged. It is important to encourage participation, and the
cost of ignoring or filtering poor answers in minimal.
This list of outcomes captures the desired behavior of users interacting
on the proposed QA system. The difficulty with mechanism design is mapping
these outcomes to a set of rules for distributing rewards that enforces these
outcomes with self-interested agents. Essentially, the problem of designing an
incentive mechanism can be expressed in three steps:
1. Identify a set of desired outcomes (expert participation)
2. Select a reward that is meaningful to the target audience
3. Distribute the reward in a fashion that maintains the desired outcomes
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These steps correspond to the three research questions presented in section 1.2.
Expert participation as a desired outcome requires a meaningful definition of
expertise. Chapter 4 describes several ways identifying the target demographic
of experts according to expertise topic and content creator reputation. The
next section, 5.1, takes a closer look at what types of incentives would motivate
the participation of live users in a QA based online community. This section
provides a solution to research question 2. This is followed by the development
and evaluation of a full incentive mechanism in sections 5.2 and 5.3 in response
to research question 3.
5.1 Choosing an Incentive
Online communities and peer-production systems rely on human users
to create, curate, and moderate content. Such communities add value to the
users by maintaining and distributing this content. Often the content creators
act purely out of goodwill and a sense of helpfulness.
It is increasingly common for online communities to use achievement
based incentives to motivate users to participate. Such incentives include
leader-board standings, custom titles, trophies, and avatars. This is essen-
tially giving virtual prizes for participating in the online community. Such
incentives are very effective for a portion of the population. The leading users
on Yahoo! Answers will often answer 80+ questions per day, every day, for
as long as the website has been live [39]. These fanatical users are strongly
motivated by the achievement based incentives.
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A reciprocal incentive is fundamentally different. A reciprocal incentive
rewards people who answer questions in a QA website by assigning them a
score, which is then used to calculate the reward that another person will
receive when answering the first person’s questions. Therefore, people who
answer the questions of others will be given priority when asking questions of
their own. This is like gaining priority access to the knowledge of the entire
community in exchange for providing answers. The key difference is that
the rewards in a reciprocal incentive mechanism have systemic value. These
rewards directly help the recipient accomplish something within the system.
An achievement reward must provide its own value in isolation to the recipient.
Recall RQ2 in section 1.2.2:
RQ 2: How effective are systemic reciprocal rewards for encourag-
ing expert participation in an online community?
This research posits that a reciprocal incentive would encourage greater partic-
ipation, particularly from experts, than an achievement incentive in an online
community. A common form of online community is a question and answer
forum, and this domain was chosen for further investigation. A required step
in creating such a mechanism is to decide what reward to give beneficial users.
In economics, the reward is typically monetary because it is valued by the vast
majority of people. In popular websites this approach is rarely feasible [14]. In
order to address this first question of what type of reward to give and to gauge
human interest in reciprocal mechanisms, a survey was performed comparing
achievement based incentives and reciprocal incentives in QA systems.
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5.1.1 Survey on Q&A Rewards
A short web-based survey was administered to 380 anonymous volun-
teers, including mostly engineering graduate students. The survey was through
the Google Docs platform as a shared document. No personally identifiable
information was collected, and the test subjects were not compensated for
their participation in any way. The survey link was emailed through several
distribution channels, and participants were encouraged to spread the link to
others. The vast majority of participants took the survey within three days
of its posting. Therefore, there is some selection bias, as most of those who
took the survey have much in common, and this does not accurately represent
the user base of a general purpose question and answer website. It is also
possible that respondents think may not be a very strong judge of what actu-
ally motivates themselves. A more conclusive test would involve constructing
identical full QA systems that differ in only the type of incentive provided to
participants. An A/B test could then be performed to compare the two in-
centives and check for significant differences in preference [57]. This is further
discussed in section 5.3. Additionally, responses are available only for those
who volunteered for the survey, and presumably these people may be those
who are most outspoken against current practices in online communities.
With this caveat in place, it is important to stress that the purpose of
this survey was simply to measure interest in alternative incentives, specifi-
cally reciprocal incentives, for participation in online communities. The survey
presented to the volunteers is as follows:
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Q&A Survey
Thank you for participating in this survey. The purpose of this
survey is to gain insight into how people behave in online com-
munities. The survey is completely anonymous and optional. The
results will be used only in aggregate. Please complete the survey
no more than once, but feel free to pass it to others. If you have
any questions please contact me at deangelis@mail.utexas.edu.
1. What is your highest education level?
• Some high school
• High school diploma
• College degree
• Graduate/Professional Degree
2. Are you familiar with question and answer (Q&A) websites
such as Yahoo! Answers, Stack Overflow, and Quora?
• Yes
• No
3. Have you used such sites to look up the answer to an existing
question? This includes arriving at a Q&A site through a




4. Have you used such sites to ask a question?
• Yes
• No
5. Have you used such sites to answer a question?
• Yes
• No
Incentives for Participation The following questions examine
two different classes of incentives for an online question and
answer system. The two classes are ‘achievement-based in-
centives’ and ‘reciprocal incentives’.
6. An ‘achievement-based incentive’ rewards participation in a
Q&A website with leader board standings, custom titles, tro-
phies, and avatars. This is like gaining virtual prizes for par-
ticipating online. How much would an ‘achievement-based





• None at all
7. A ‘reciprocal incentive’ rewards people who answer questions
in a Q&A website by assigning them a score, which is then
used to calculate the reward that another person will receive
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when answering the first person’s questions. Therefore, people
who answer the questions of others will be given priority when
asking questions of their own. This is like gaining priority ac-
cess to the knowledge of the entire community in exchange for
providing answers. How much would a ‘reciprocal incentive’




• None at all
8. Would you be more likely to use a question and answer website





Over a period of 3 days, 380 people responded to the survey. This
section presents the results of this survey along with significance analysis.
Figure 5.1 shows the education level of the survey responders. As ex-
pected, the survey sample is comprised of mostly graduate students. The
intuition behind this question is that those with more education may have
greater expertise and the ability to contribute more to a QA system, and it
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Figure 5.1: Survey responder education level
indicator of responder age and perhaps socio-economic status.
Figure 5.2 shows the level of experience that the responders have re-
garding online QA systems. Each of the four axes represents a yes/no question
from the survey, and the position of the bold line as it crosses the axis indicates
the number of affirmative responses. This figure shows that the vast majority
of the survey responders are familiar with QA websites and gain value from
them by looking up existing question and answer pairs. It is suspected that a
large portion of the reference usage was driven by search engine query results.
Only roughly one quarter of the responders have used QA systems in an active
sense; that is, they have asked or answered questions. It is likely that this is
due to a lack of suitable rewards for participation.
Figure 5.3 shows how the survey responders answered questions six and
seven. This provides strong evidence that a reciprocal incentive is preferred
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Figure 5.2: Survey responder Q&A experience level
except the bars representing the “a little” response, are statistically significant
according a binomial test with α = 0.01. This shows us that approximately
75% of the responders claim that an achievement incentive motivates them
to participate only a little or none at all. In comparison this number for the
reciprocal mechanism is only 55%. This point is made only more salient by
looking at the other end of the spectrum. Nearly twice as many people rated
the reciprocal incentives as having some or a lot of effect as compared to the
achievement incentive.
Figure 5.4 shows the overall user preference between achievement in-
centives and reciprocal incentives. It becomes clear that reciprocal incentives










A lot Some A little None at all
Incentive Desirability 
Achievement Incentive Reciprocal Incentive








Total	  =	  380	  
Figure 5.4: Survey responder incentive preference
110
Table 5.1: χ2 test of independence
Variable 1 Variable 2 χ2 df p-value
Achievement Reciprocal vs. Achievement 67.76 3 < .0001
Reciprocal Reciprocal vs. Achievement 22.07 3 < .0001
Education Reciprocal vs. Achievement 0.8 3 0.8495
Familiar with Q&A Reciprocal vs. Achievement 0.01 1 0.9203
Used as a reference Reciprocal vs. Achievement 0.07 1 0.7913
Asked a question Reciprocal vs. Achievement 1.91 1 0.167
Answered a question Reciprocal vs. Achievement 0.06 1 0.8065
intentionally written in a very unambiguous fashion, and the responders were
required to choose one or the other, with no option to mark “undecided”.
This question does not capture the strength of the preference for reciprocal
incentives, but it does support the use of such incentives. In practice, using a
reciprocal incentive does not preclude using additional achievement-based in-
centives. Many successful online communities function very well with achieve-
ment incentives. This survey simply indicates that there is strong interest in
creating something different. There is no reason that a community cannot
be built using both reciprocal and achievement based incentives in order to
appeal to the largest target population.
Table 5.1 shows the results of a χ2 test for independence of the various
factors in the survey1. The first column, Variable 1, represents a particular
question from the survey, while Variable 2 is the final question regarding over-
all preference. The χ2 test for independence measures the independence of
these two variables. In other words, “Is the final incentive preference (recip-
1Note that for df=1 the χ2 value reported is the Yates χ2, corrected for continuity.
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rocal vs. achievement) dependent on the answers to the question expressed in
Variable 1 ?” The third column is the χ2 statistic and the fourth column con-
tains a measure of the degrees of freedom. The fifth column, p-value, represents
the significance of the relationship. As expected, the variables Achievement
and Reciprocal are not independent of final preference. This means that ques-
tions 6 and 7 regarding incentive effectiveness do affect the final preference of
reciprocal or achievement incentives. This is expected behavior, because those
who are motivated by achievement incentives would choose to prefer achieve-
ment incentives, and the same holds true for reciprocal incentives. This table
becomes more interesting for the remaining tests. It indicates that preference
for reciprocal or achievement incentives is completely independent of the other
variables, including education level, familiarity with QA, reference usage, ques-
tioning usage, and answering usage. This means that reciprocal incentives are
significantly preferred, regardless of how the dataset is sliced into subsets.
We have established that reciprocal incentives are preferred over achieve-
ment incentives in the survey presented here. There is a chance that the re-
sponders do not have an accurate picture of how these rewards are earned.
Perhaps they underestimate the amount of effort needed to earn a valuable re-
ward. At some point many easy to earn achievement rewards are preferred to
a more time-consuming reciprocal reward. Nevertheless, this survey strongly
indicates that reciprocal incentives are vastly more desirable than the current
standard, achievement incentives. With this information we can construct
an incentive mechanism based on reciprocal systemic rewards for encouraging
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expert participation in an online community.
5.2 Developing an Incentive Mechanism
Once a suitable reward is found, as described above in section 5.1, the
next step is designing a mechanism to distribute the rewards in exchange for
positive behavior in order to maximize the occurrence of the desired outcomes
X as described in section 5. For the analysis in this section it is assumed
that the reciprocal systemic rewards are desired and that the utility of these
rewards is linear with respect to reward quantity. This section introduces
notation and terminology originally developed by Hurwicz and Reiter in [36]
for designing economic mechanisms. Here it has been adapted to QA systems.
Question and answers systems can be considered privacy-preserving games of
private information, or Bayesian games. Users, or agents, generally know their
own expertise, but that is not necessarily public information, it is considered
private. Users are not forced to answer questions or share their full knowledge,
though they can choose to, hence the game is privacy-preserving. Each user, or
agent, in a QA system is capable of answering questions honestly, promptly,
and to the best of its ability. This optimal set of behaviors is called called
the agent’s true type and is represented with the symbol θ. A user is said
to report its type by expressing certain behaviors. The observed actions of
agents are then called the reported type, represented as θ̂. The set of all possible
types, or behaviors, that a user can take, including asking questions, answering
questions, evaluating content, and defecting from the system is called Θ. The
113
mechanism y is a set of rules, or a function, that takes into account the game
environment, g, and is executed on a reported type, y(θ̂). The result of this
mechanism is an allocation of influence points, or a particular outcome, z, in
the set of all outcomes Y . Therefore:
y(θ̂) : Θ→ Y
The goal of mechanism design is to design an allocation y based on reported
type θ̂ that has an equilibrium state ξ that implements the social choice func-
tion f(θ). The social choice function can be considered a target benchmark
for the mechanism. f(θ) maps the true type θ, not the reported type θ̂, which
can include deception or fraud, of each agent to the set of desired outcomes,
X.
f(θ) : Θ→ X
The revelation principle states [61]:
For any Bayesian Nash equilibrium there corresponds a Bayesian
game with the same equilibrium outcome but in which players
truthfully report type.
An incentive mechanism is designed to operate in a particular equilibrium
state. At equilibrium, agents report their type as a function of their true type,
θ̂(θ). Searching for equilibria in a Bayesian game is very difficult because the
action space for each agent is large. It can choose to answer questions honestly,
or it can lie, or it can refuse to respond at all. The revelation principle allows
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us to restrict our search to just those states where agents truthfully report
their type, θ̂ = θ. In other words we must consider only states in which agents
are honest, albeit selfish participants.
Consider the set of desired outcomes X in section 5 and consider the
set of rules below:
1. Users earn influence points when answering questions correctly.
2. Answers deemed incorrect or spam do not receive a reward.
3. The influence points earned by a user answering a question are dependent
on the influence of the user who asked the question.
4. An influence point bonus is awarded for authoring the best answer to a
question, and this bonus is also dependent on the influence of the user
who asked the question.
5. Users have a nonzero influence point balance when entering the system.
6. Influence points decay with time.
The first desired outcome is that users are not penalized for asking a question
or giving a poor answer. There is no penalty for these behaviors specified in
the rules. The only penalty is implicit. That is, users will waste their own
time and effort by giving poor answers or asking worthless questions. Closely
related to this is the second desired outcome that satisfactory answers are
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worth more than unsatisfactory answers. According to rule 2, unsatisfactory
answers are not rewarded.
The third desired outcome is that answering a question of higher value
yields higher rewards. Rule 3 supports this outcome because users who answer
higher value questions correctly receive greater rewards than those who answer
lower value questions. These higher value questions are those that originate
from highly influential users.
Rule 4 enforces the fourth desired outcome that users should be re-
warded for answering very difficult questions in place of ordinary questions.
Very difficult questions do not necessarily have a larger reward associated with
them because rewards are based on questioner influence, and more influential
users do not necessarily ask more difficult questions [39]. This concern is why
a “best answer” bonus is built into this mechanism. A more difficult question
is likely to draw fewer answers, increasing the chances of giving the designated
best answer and earning the bonus reward.
Rules 5 and 6 support the fifth desired outcome that recently added
users should be able to compete with more established users. Returning users
may build up substantial influence through participation over time. A new user
is likely to have very little accumulated influence even though he may have
significant expertise. This disparity means a new user’s question is likely to
have low priority, while the experienced user will be given high priority simply
for having participated over a longer period of time. A decay function applied
to a user’s accumulated influence would ensure that only active members are
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given priority over others.
Proof. Let It(q) be the influence of user q at time t
When t = 0,
It(a) >> It(b)




Sustained participation by b implies
⇒ ∃n(In(b) > In(a))
As described above, this mechanism maps the reported types θ̂ to the
desired outcome, X. Because of the revelation principle, we can say that the
mechanism implements the social choice function f . Each agent fares best
when truthfully reporting their type, or participating to the fullest extent of
their abilities, regardless of the actions of other agents. Therefore we can say
the mechanism is incentive compatible. This creates a Bayes Nash equilibrium
ξ where each agent reports truthfully and earns maximal rewards. There is
no incentive for agents to deviate from their strategy of truthful reporting
when others have not also done so. Moreover, the strategy that arrives at this
equilibrium point is a dominant strategy. Regardless of the behavior of others,
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it is always in the best interest of a user to answer questions to the best of his
or her ability.
This mechanism has been shown to be incentive compatible. Simply
put, this means the mechanism encourages beneficial behaviors in individuals,
while not encouraging damaging behavior. Incentive compatibility does not
mean the mechanism is optimal however. There is perhaps a better mecha-
nism for inducing the desired outcome. The optimal mechanism is domain
specific. The optimal mechanism for one QA system may not be identical
to the optimal mechanism for another. Optimality can be achieved through
rigorous experimentation on a specific implementation and with very precise
domain knowledge. Creating an optimal incentive mechanism for QA systems
is outside scope of this research.
This mechanism is incentive compatible because it implements the so-
cial choice function when operating at a Bayes Nash equilibrium point where
agents participate honestly and to the best of their abilities. However, there
is one potential weaknesses: collusion. Collusion occurs when multiple users
work together to exploit the system. For instance, if a user with a high level
of influence creates meaningless questions and a second user responds to these
questions while the first user rates the answers highly, the second user will gain
rewards rapidly. However, relative differences in influence are meaningful. If
many users have high levels of influence, the value (question priority) for any
one of those users drops. Therefore, in smaller systems the mechanism does
protect against this type of fraud. Additionally, users who are not in collusion
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can mark this content as spam, thereby eliminating the value to those in col-
lusion. A more dangerous weakness is the threat of shared accounts. Multiple
users operating under the same username are likely to have more expertise
and availability than a single user. Therefore, it is likely that they will have a
higher influence score. If many people band together under a single name each
person would reap the rewards of a high influence score. Fortunately there are
infrastructure-level ways to thwart this fraud. A simple example is disallow-
ing a person to be logged in from two locations simultaneously. Section 5.4
contains a more thorough discussion of fraud in QA systems in general. The
following section contains an experiment that compares the performance of
this mechanism to the industry standard as implemented by Yahoo! Answers.
5.3 Testing the Incentive Mechanism
Chapter 4 is devoted to identifying the target audience of experts in
an online community. Section 5.1 describes a type promising type of incen-
tive, and section 5.2 describes the design of a mechanism for a question and
answer system. With these pieces in place, it is possible to test the expected
performance of a full QA system.
Ideally such tests would measure the expertise and participation levels
of a population of users interacting on a live QA system. At one point on
Yahoo! Answers there were approximately 120 million users and 400 million
answers [51]. This yields a participation rate of roughly 3.3 responses per user
over their entire lifespan on the system. The number of questions seen by
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each of these users, or the number of impressions, is unknown. Assume this
number is 100. This means that Yahoo! Answers has a conversion rate of
0.03. A 25% improvement on this performance requires a conversion rate of
0.0416. An A/B test for significance would then require > 3, 000 impressions
in the test group and > 3, 000 impressions in the control group to show that
the experimental group based on the new incentive mechanism outperforms
the control group based on Yahoo! Answers with 95% significance [57]. If the
measured improvement is < 25%, then more impressions would be necessary.
Such a study would involve building a fully functional QA system, re-
cruiting several thousand users, and randomly assigning them to control and
experimental groups. Such a study is outside the scope of this research. A
large commercial QA site expressed interest in running this experiment on their
existing live user base, but negotiations proved unsuccessful. For these rea-
sons a software simulation based on observed human behavior was constructed
to compare the performance of the experimental incentive mechanism to the
standard model, as used in Yahoo! Answers and modified by others.
5.3.1 Experimental Setup
A software simulator was created to compare an incentive mechanism
based on reciprocal rewards to an incentive mechanism based on achievement
rewards. This simulation was populated with agents designed to mimic human
behavior in current QA sites, such as Yahoo! Answers and the Java Forum [89].
The Python programming language was chosen to implement the simulation.
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The simulation begins by instantiating a fixed number of agents I, each
representing a human user. These agents begin with a fixed number of reward
points upon instantiation. The expertise x of each agent i is represented by
a normal distribution. Two fixed numbers, the expertise mean xµi and the
expertise standard deviation xσi are unique to each agent and used to define
this distribution.
∀i ∈ I, xi ∼ N(xµi , xσi)
Because it has been observed that users’ abilities follow a power law
distribution [89], the expertise means xµi and expertise standard deviations xσi
are assigned according the following equation, where r is a uniformly random
number in the range [0.0, 1.0) and m and s are fixed constants. This expertise
initialization matches the observed participants. There are exponentially fewer
participants at the higher expertise levels.
∀i ∈ I, xµi = rm
∀i ∈ I, xσi = rs
Once these expertise models for each agent are initialized, a simulation
cycle begins. One cycle is defined as a process in which:
• A random subset of the agents generates questions.
• Each agent has the opportunity to view some subset of the generated
questions and estimates an expected reward.
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• Each agent then ranks the questions it has seen in order of expected
reward and chooses to answer a subset of these questions. This ranking
is based on the expected reward calculation, which is dependent on which
incentive mechanism is currently applied.
• Answers are generated and rewards are distributed based on the quality
of the answer and the quality of others’ answers.
• If the reciprocal incentive mechanism is in effect, then a decay factor is
applied to the standing point balances for each agent.
• Some subset of the agents defect and leave the system, while some new
agents are introduced.
Typically users with lower expertise are more likely to ask questions.
This simulation models this as a linear relationship, where the probability of
an agent asking a question in a single cycle P (Ai) is defined below, where α
is a constant, called the question ask constant.
∀i ∈ I, P (Ai) =
−xµi + 1
α
The set of all questions qj is called Q. A question qj has a difficulty,
dj, which is defined below. Note that the difficulty of the question is not a
function of the asker’s expertise, xµi . This matches observations that experts
do not necessarily ask more difficult questions. The questions may simply be
in a topic that the users have very little expertise in, see section 4.1. Less
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difficult questions are much more plentiful, however. Therefore this is also
modeled as a power law distribution, where r is a uniformly random number
in the range [0.0, 1.0) and D is a fixed constant called the difficulty exponent.
Also, under the control mechanism based on Yahoo! Answers the agent who
asks a question has 5 points deducted from its balance. There is no deduction
in the experimental reciprocal mechanism.
∀qj ∈ Q, dj = rD
Once the questions for that cycle are generated, the agents must select
which questions to answer in order to maximize their reward. It is unrealis-
tic that every agent can observe and calculate a predicted reward for every
available question. This would be equivalent to a human reading the entire
database of open questions on Yahoo! Answers, which numbers in the hun-
dreds of thousands [39]. Therefore, the probability that any given question qj
is considered by agent i, is calculated as P (Cqj ,i).
[∀i ∈ I,∀qj ∈ Q], P (Cqj ,i) =
β
|Q|K
|Q| represents the number of questions, and β and K are constants
called the question seen constant, and the question exponent, respectively. This
equation indicates that as the number of questions grows, the probability of
a single agent seeing one particular question shrinks exponentially. The sim-
ulator has additional functionality that can fix Pqj ,i = 1 for all q and j. This
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mode of operation emulates an ideal recommender. A recommender recom-
mends content to users, and in the context of QA systems, it will recommend
a question to a user who wishes to answer a question. An ideal recommender
would examine all possible questions and return an optimal subset of questions
to answer. Fixing the probability that a question is considered to 1 ensures
that all possible questions are considered, and the agent can then select the
questions to answer from the entire pool of questions. Section 4.1 describes
recommendation in detail.
Let the set of all considered questions qj by agent i be called Ci. For
each considered question, the agent calculates the expected reward for an-
swering this question. This expected reward, Ei,qj , is simply the probability of
answering the question correctly times the reward for doing so. This reward
is dependent on the incentive mechanism being used by the system. For the
control group which emulates the mechanism used in Yahoo! Answers, simply
supplying an answer is worth 2 points, and 10 points are given for supplying
the best answer. Additional points are given for the number of times that a
user “likes” the answer. See table 2.1 for a full description of this mechanism.
Calculating the probability of giving a best answer or the expected number
of “likes” requires modeling every other agent in the system, and this is im-
practical for large systems. Therefore, when operating under the the Yahoo!
Answers mechanism the simulation agents calculate Ei,qj based on the expec-
tation of getting the answer correct, and a correct answer is worth 1 additional
point. Agents know their own expertise distributions, which is ∼ N(xµi , xσi),
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and the question difficulty dj is a fixed number between 0 and 1. Therefore,
the probability of getting the correct answer equals the probability of draw-
ing a number zi,qj from their expertise distribution that is greater than the
question difficulty, dj. It is reasonable to assume that live users are capable
of determining how well they are able to answer a given question. It is much
more difficult and unlikely that users will know the probability of others giving
correct answers to a question.
[∀i ∈ I,∀qj ∈ Ci], Ei,qj = 2 + P (zi,qj > dj)
When operating under the experimental reciprocal mechanism devel-
oped in section 5.2, this expected reward E∗i,qj is now a function of the point
total of the questioner, pj, and a constant weight, ω.
[∀i ∈ I,∀qj ∈ Ci], E∗i,qj = P (zi,qj > dj)pjω
Each agent then sorts all of the considered questions by expected reward
and answers them starting with the highest expected reward. The agent stops
answering questions when one of three criteria occurs:
1. All of the considered questions have been answered.
2. The expected reward for questions qj becomes ≤ 0.
3. The agent has answered the maximum number of questions per cycle, a
fixed constant M .
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An answer is simply a number drawn from the expertise distribution
of an agent. Rewards are calculated based on the difficulty of the question dj,
the quality of the answer, zi,qj , and depending on which incentive mechanism
is used, the point total of the questioner, pj. The answers for each question are
then collected and evaluated. The best answer to a question is the answer with
the highest value of those given for that question. The agent who supplied this
best answer is given a bonus B of 10 points in the Yahoo! Answers mechanism,
and a bonus B∗j of five times the reward of an answer that is simply correct in
the experimental mechanism. When the answer is not the best answer B = 0.
These rewards Rij for the control mechanism and R
∗
ij for the experimental
mechanism are expressed below.
Rij =
{
3 +B : zi,qj ≥ dj






j : zi,qj ≥ dj
0 : zi,qj < dj
(5.2)
These points are then awarded to each user. In the Yahoo! Answers
website, there is a problem of users copying content from the answers of oth-
ers in an attempt to create the most comprehensive answer. This predatory
behavior is called sniping. Such fraudulent behaviors are discussed further
in section 5.4. One of the rules of the experimental mechanism is that users
cannot see others’ responses until the question has been closed and rewards
distributed. This rule eliminates the threat of sniping. This simulation recre-
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ates Yahoo! Answers in a favorable light because sniping is not possible. Also,
note that zero points are awarded in the experimental mechanism if the cor-
rect answer is not achieved. This is done to eliminate the incentive to create
worthless, or spam answers.
In the control mechanism points are accumulated, and then they are
spent when asking a question, see table 2.1. This discourages people from
asking questions. Often those with the most expertise ask very few questions,
if any. They do not want to risk their leader board standing. These are the
most valuable people in the community, yet they are punished by the control
incentive mechanism. In the experimental mechanism, asking questions is not
discouraged, and there is no penalty for doing so. Under this mechanism,
the relative difference in points accumulated has real value. Because their
questions are “worth more”, the leaders are given priority consideration when
asking questions. In order to prevent this from becoming an exclusive club
and discouraging new users from participating, new users are instantiated
with a balance of 100 points, and point balances undergo a time decay in the
experimental mechanism. In the simulation after each cycle the point balances
are reduced by ε under the experimental mechanism.
A major obstacle that many online communities face is user attrition.
In order to best model a real community operating in the steady-state, this
simulation models the influx of new users and the defection of current users.
The simulation built by Zhang, Ackerman, and Adamic in [89] models incom-
ing new users until a certain graph density is achieved. This represents the
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bootstrapping problem of how an online community is formed, but it does
not accurately capture the steady-state operation of a mature community. To
simulate defection the agents are ranked according to point balance. The prob-
ability of agent i defecting P (Fi) is then a function of their percentile rank t
in the system. This ensures that the most successful agents are very unlikely
to defect, while those who have difficulty accumulating points are much more








Using this equation for calculating the probability of defection P (Fi),







− 0.2 dt = 0.0666̄
This means that roughly 6.7% of the all the users will defect in any given cycle,
and lower ranked users are much more likely to do so. This more accurately
represents the behavior in a live system than simply eliminating the lowest
performers. To balance this attrition, new users are introduced. The number
of new agents, or users, added every cycle is determined by an integer that
is ∼ N(0.07|I|, 0.01|I|). Recall that |I| is the number of users in the system.
These two equations representing defecting existing users and the creation of
new users are balanced. This is designed to model the steady state operation
of a QA system with very slow growth, and these parameters can be adjusted
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Table 5.2: Simulation parameters
Name Symbol Value
Initial number of users |I| 250
Expertise exponent m 3
Expertise standard deviation multiplier s 0.2
Question ask constant α 10
Difficulty exponent D 3
Question seen constant β 2
Question exponent K 0.5
Reciprocal reward weight ω 0.1
Maximum number of answers M 5
Point decay percentage ε 5%
to model other scenarios. Table 5.2 summarizes the simulation parameters
used for the experiments in section 5.3.2.
5.3.2 Simulation Results
The simulator was run in several different configurations for fifty com-
plete cycles. One set of fifty cycles completes a single round. Results were
then collected after twenty rounds have been completed. Reward points and
users persist between cycles, but there is no concept of state that is preserved
between cycles. Because we are most concerned with the behaviors of experts
in this simulation, this section analyzes the performance of the top perform-
ing agents. Reward points are an artificial construct designed to encourage
participation among the experts. Analyzing point accumulation alone is not
meaningful, therefore the analysis presented here focuses on expertise and
participation, which have a measurable impact on the usefulness of the com-
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Table 5.3: Top 10% of point earners
standard reciprocal reciprocal?
Measurement X̄ σ̂ X̄ σ̂ X̄ σ̂
Expertise mean, µ 0.745 0.151 0.838 0.118 0.886 0.0745
# Questions asked 0.941 0.957 0.569 0.869 0.462 0.776
# Answers received 66.75 42.25 62.46 52.29 83.41 83.23
# Questions answered 248.68 1.425 175.11 64.78 192.54 56.65
munity. Table 5.3 contains the data collected from the top 10% of the point
earners after fifty cycles, averaged over twenty rounds.
Table 5.3 shows the performance of the top point earners. In other
words, these measurements characterize the agents in the system that earned
the highest rewards. This can be used to evaluate the incentive mechanism
because this table describes the behaviors of most rewarded agents. The first
configuration in Table 5.3, the “standard” column group, represents the per-
formance characteristics of a generalized version of the Yahoo! Answers mech-
anism. This simulated mechanism is actually expected to perform better than
the authentic version because the simulated version is immune to sniping and
spam. The second column group contains the performance measurements of
the reciprocal mechanism that is developed in section 5.2. The final column
group, labeled “reciprocal?”, duplicates the functionality of the “reciprocal”
mechanism, but with the added component of an ideal recommender. Es-
sentially this recommender mimics the functionality of an omniscient recom-
mender because it allows agents to evaluate all questions and pick the most
suitable ones to answer. Ordinarily an agent has a limited pool of questions
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under consideration, which models the human usage of a QA system. On a
system of any appreciable size, no user has the ability or inclination to read
every question. Section 4.1 discusses recommendation further.
Because each of the measurements in Table 5.3 represents data that
are collected from twenty rounds of fifty cycles each, the measurements are
expressed as a sample mean, X̄, and a sample standard deviation σ̂. The size
of each sample is then equal to the number of rounds, in this case twenty.
The first row contains the average expertise mean, µi, for the agents
in the top 10% of point earners. Recall that agents are instantiated with
an expertise mean drawn from a power law, and it is bounded between zero
and one, with lower values much more likely. Both the reciprocal and the
reciprocal? mechanisms are more effective than the standard at rewarding the
agents with the highest expertise. This difference is statistically significant
according to an independent, two sample, two tailed t-test for statistical sig-
nificance (α < 0.05). Figure 5.5 illustrates this.
The next row shows the average number of questions asked by the top
ranked agents. As expected, the top ranked agents do not ask many questions.
This is because the probability of asking a question is inversely proportional
the expertise level of the agent, and naturally the top earning agents are those
with the most expertise. Due to the high sample standard deviation values






















Figure 5.5: Mean expertise of the top 10% of point earners
The following row contains the average number of answers received per
top ranked agent. Here again the reciprocal mechanisms perform at least as
well as the standard mechanism. Consider that under the reciprocal mecha-
nisms the agents asked roughly half as many questions as the agents adhering
to the standard mechanism, yet they receive as many or more (in the case
of reciprocal?) responses. Therefore, under the reciprocal mechanism the top
performers receive twice as many responses for their questions. This is a key
strength of the reciprocal mechanism. These extra responses comprise the
systemic reciprocal reward.
The final row in Table 5.3 shows the number of questions answered by
the top earning agents. The standard mechanism consistently yields a signif-
icantly larger number of questions answered than the other mechanisms, as
132
Table 5.4: Top 10% of experts, by µi
standard reciprocal reciprocal?
Measurement X̄ σ̂ X̄ σ̂ X̄ σ̂
Expertise mean, µ 0.896 0.0585 0.941 0.0339 0.941 0.0342
# Questions asked 0.321 0.603 0.153 0.380 0.162 0.404
# Answers received 23.34 27.04 16.57 23.15 28.40 45.30
# Questions answered 146.55 98.56 133.87 86.07 142.31 85.99
indicated by the highest mean and small standard deviation. This is because
the Yahoo! Answers mechanism rewards simply providing an answer, as indi-
cated in table 2.1, regardless of correctness or if it comes from a reliable, expert
source. Additionally, it is suspected that this is due to the bootstrapping dy-
namics of the experimental mechanisms. Under these reciprocal mechanisms,
each agent starts on a level playing field, but it is possible to gain rewards more
rapidly than in the standard model, causing fragmentation within the commu-
nity. An agent with high expertise which fails several questions shortly after
instantiation will be much more likely to defect from the system, as described
in section 5.3.1. Ultimately, this means that some of the highest achievers are
relative newcomers to the community, and they simply have not had the time
to answer as many questions. Under the standard mechanism those with the
most expertise slowly percolate to the top, and they tend to stay there for a
long time and answer many questions.
Table 5.4 is very similar to table 5.3, but instead of measuring the
agents from the top 10% of point earners, it contains measurements from the













































Figure 5.6: Answers received per questions asked among the top 10% by mean
expertise
can be used to evaluate the incentive mechanism directly. Table 5.4 is per-
haps even more interesting because it shows how the top experts in the system
behave. The first thing to notice is the strong similarity between these two
tables. The expertise means in the first row of Table 5.3 are close to the true
maximum expertise means as shown in table 5.4. This assures us that all of the
tested mechanisms are fairly effective at identifying the experts and that the
reciprocal mechanisms outperform the standard mechanism. All mechanisms
instantiate users in the same manner. The only remaining explanation for the
discrepancy in expertise mean values (µ) between the different mechanisms is
that the standard mechanism kept some of the best experts at an artificially
low reward level and promoted lesser agents, thus increasing the chance of
expert defection. Also notice in this table the difference in the number of
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answers received per question asked across the three mechanisms is even more
apparent. This is illustrated in Figure 5.6. The final row in table 5.4 shows
that the agents with the highest expertise do not answer significantly more
questions under the standard mechanism. Therefore, the reciprocal mecha-
nisms are just as good as the standard one for encouraging experts to answer
questions. This section demonstrates that in a software simulation the recip-
rocal mechanism outperforms the standard Yahoo! Answers based mechanism
according to several different metrics, including rewarding expertise and draw-
ing a larger number of responses per question asked by experts, as shown in
Figures 5.5 and 5.6.
5.4 Q&A Fraud
Because the reward of system influence has real value, users may be
tempted to cheat the system to unfairly collect larger rewards. This hurts
others in the system because the relative disparity in influence scores helps to
drive others to participate. Thus, artificially inflated scores can unbalance the
system.
Fraud can have many different forms. Often in aggregative systems a
user may simply create spam for one of two reasons. First is to advertise an
outside product or service in which the user has an interest. Thankfully we
can rely on the collective wisdom of the other users to identify this behavior
and nullify its effects. Another type of spam is the contribution of relevant but
low quality content in an attempt to inflate one’s participation score. From a
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system perspective this appears almost identical to a situation where a user
with little expertise but much free time contributes much content at the best
of his ability - a situation we wish to encourage. Fortunately this type of
behavior is not rewarded as greatly as the case when a user demonstrates true
expertise. This is due to the collaborative nature of the incentive mechanism.
Endorsements from users with high expertise would allow greater influence
achievement when contributing valuable content.
The incentive mechanism must be designed to combat various types
of fraud. Some obvious fraud deterrents include harsh penalties for getting
caught performing fraudulent behavior. Perhaps less obtrusive, this research
combats fraud through the principle of incentive compatibility. A mechanism
is said to be incentive compatible if every participant fares best (earns the
most reward) by truthfully sharing private information, or in the context of
QA, participating to the best of his ability. Though widely adopted, the mech-
anism behind Yahoo! Answers has a design flaw: it provides an incentive for
answer sniping. Sniping occurs when a responder may not know the answer to
a question and simply collects pertinent pieces of the answers from previous
responders. Then this responder may have the most comprehensive answer,
though he/she did not add any new content. This act of assembling the infor-
mation does have some value, but rewarding this user instead of the original
contributors does them a disservice. Jain, Chen, and Parkes state that this
mechanism is not incentive compatible with a desired outcome because users
have an incentive to snipe answers [40]. They suggest a rule where the asker
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distributes the rewards across multiple answer contributors. The mechanism
developed in section 5.2 has a more elegant solution to this problem: respon-
ders cannot see the responses of others until the question answering period is
completed, as decided by either by the original questioner or a system-wide
policy based on activity and time. This simple change to the mechanics of a
QA system eliminates the threat of answer sniping while maintaining author
integrity.
Several types of fraud may be more difficult to prevent using incen-
tive mechanism design. One consideration is that users may simply create
positive feedback for themselves. Because the influence score is based on the
feedback and influence of the rating user, a user who evaluates his content
positively would create an infinite loop. This is thwarted in the proposed QA
system by simply disallowing a user from rating his own content. This type of
self-feedback can also be created in a more sophisticated manner by collusive
voting. Either multiple users may set up secret agreements to provide posi-
tive feedback, or a single user may have multiple accounts which evaluate each
other. Trust can be applied at the application level to detect this type of fraud.
Users who provide ratings that are not corroborated by others may be identi-
fied as fraudulent. If it can be observed that two or more users regularly give
each other positive feedback in the absence of positive feedback from others, it
is possible that this type of fraud has occurred. Such sophisticated techniques
for detecting and mitigating fraud are outside the scope of this dissertation.
Perhaps an even more difficult type of fraud to detect is shared ac-
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counts. From a system perspective, multiple users on the same account would
appear as a single user with very high participation and a broad body of ex-
pertise. This could enable rapid growth of influence, and each person could
reap the benefit of asking questions under this username. It is likely that
many questions of very diverse topics and length would originate from this
single user account. This could possibly be detected by analyzing the user’s
question to answer ratio or the question topic diversity. On the network level
this type of fraud may become more apparent by analyzing the IP address of
the content origin. A shared account would likely have simultaneous people
logged into the account from many different IP addresses.
Fraud has the capability to cripple an online community. It is impera-
tive to combat this fraud with all necessary means while maintaining system
functionality. Application level solutions, like trust, can be combined with
network level solutions, like traffic and IP monitoring, to detect fraudulent
behavior. The most important step toward fighting fraud is to remove any
incentive to perform fraudulent behavior through careful mechanism design.
5.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter defines the task of mechanism design, investigates a new
class of incentives, develops an incentive compatible mechanism for question
and answer systems, and tests the mechanism empirically through a software
simulation. This incentive mechanism is designed to plug into the “incentive
calculator” module of the QA system architecture presented in chapter 3. The
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results in section 5.3.2 above show that the new, experimental mechanism
modestly, yet significantly improves upon the industry standard model. This
simulation compares the mechanisms solely as an allocation of points based
on behaviors in the system. However, these benefits are magnified when the
mechanism operates on a QA system in tandem with a content recommender.
Combined with a new incentive that has been shown to be of value to live
users, these advances promise to create communities capable of promoting
and rewarding the most valuable contributors.
Recall RQ2 from section 1.2:
RQ 2: How effective are systemic reciprocal rewards for encourag-
ing expert participation in an online community?
The survey in section 5.1.1 shows that people are receptive to new classes of
rewards beyond badges and trophies. Specifically they prefer rewards that
have value within the community, or systemic rewards.
Recall RQ3 from section 1.2:
RQ 3: In the context of a question and answer system, how can an
incentive mechanism be designed to encourage expert participation?
Section 5.2 details the design and development of a new, reciprocal incen-





The purpose of this research is to discover how to encourage expert
participation in online communities. These communities are growing rapidly
and we have come to rely on them as a source of valuable information and
entertainment. They can take many forms, including a question and answer
system, a news aggregation service, a discussion forum, or a social network, just
to name a few. Most of the research presented here pertains to QA systems as
an example, but it is adaptable to other forms on online communities as well.
Experts across these various communities are those who add the most value
to the community, therefore their participation is highly desired. Encouraging
expert participation can be decomposed into three constituent problems.
1. Identifying the experts
2. Choosing a reward
3. Distributing the reward
Each of these subproblems has been discussed in detail, and novel techniques
for accomplishing these tasks have been developed. These three problems
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correspond directly to the original three research questions presented in section
1.2. Recall research question 1:
RQ 1: How can the expertise of a user in an online community be
measured?
The expertise models introduced in chapter 4 allow one to quantitatively mea-
sure the expertise of a user in an online community. The concept of topics
as distributions over words as presented in section 4.1 allows the characteri-
zation of the breadth of a user’s expertise in a QA system. In other words,
this technology allows us to identify a user’s areas of experience and interest.
The new generative model based approach of measuring expertise has been
shown to consistently outperform standard information retrieval approaches
and sometimes outperform clustering algorithms when identifying topics of
interest for a user in a QA system. The following section, 4.2, describes an
algorithm for measuring the depth of expertise, or reputation, of users in any
content oriented social network (COSN) in general. This algorithm, rooted in
the trust in multi-agent systems community, has been shown to outperform
common measures of authority, such as PageRank [63], in networks that are
prone to negative social effects. These two sections in chapter 4 introduce new
technologies to measure both breadth and depth of expertise in online com-
munities, and they are shown to perform as well or better than the established
methods.
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The second constituent problem listed above is formulated in research
question 2:
RQ 2: How effective are systemic reciprocal rewards for encourag-
ing expert participation in an online community?
A systemic reward is one that has value within the framework of the system,
or community. Such rewards are given in exchange for contributing valuable
expertise to the community. They are designed to give extra functionality,
enjoyment, or ease of use to the awardee. By their very nature they must
be distributed in a competitive manner, otherwise they would simply be im-
plemented in the community for all users to take advantage of. For example,
priority access to information or users has no value if all users are given pri-
ority. This reward is said to be reciprocal because the reward gained by a
content creator is a function of the social influence of the user who requested
the content. Systemic reciprocal rewards are a new class of rewards for online
communities. The standard reward model in industry is an achievement-based
model where users gain virtual prizes and leader board standings for their par-
ticipation. Beyond bragging rights these rewards have no value. Section 5.1
presents a survey measuring the reward preference of 380 volunteers. The re-
sults unequivocally show a strong preference for systemic reciprocal rewards
over the industry standard rewards, regardless of participant demographic in-
formation. This research is the first to show that access to peer generated
content can directly motivate people to apply their own expertise, thereby
generating more content.
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The third constituent problem listed above is formulated in research
question 3:
RQ 3: In the context of a question and answer system, how can an
incentive mechanism be designed to encourage expert participation?
Section 5.1 presents a suitable reward for expert participation, and section 5.2
describes the design of a full mechanism based on such a reward and analyzes
its performance in a software simulation of a QA system. The experimen-
tal, or reciprocal, mechanism has been shown to more effectively reward and
retain the experts in a community than the industry standard point-based
mechanism. In addition to this benefit, the experts themselves received more
answers when asking their own questions under the reciprocal incentive mech-
anism. Section 5.2 also shows that ideal recommendation only magnifies these
effects. Moreover, the reciprocal mechanism eliminates the incentive to create
spam and snipe answers, and it does not discourage asking questions. Because
of these properties the incentive mechanism developed in this research is su-
perior to the industry standard for encouraging expert participation, and this
has been empirically confirmed in a software simulation based on observed
human user behavior.
Chapter 3 describes an architecture for QA that is used as a frame-
work for developing three of the primary contributions of this research: a
multi-dimensional topic-specific model of expertise, the concept of systemic
reciprocal rewards, and a full implementation of an influence-based incentive
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mechanism. Recall the research hypothesis from chapter 1:
In an online community, a non-monetary quantitative incentive
mechanism applied to a recommendation-based architecture can in-
crease expert participation and satisfaction - both as a content cre-
ator and a consumer - and assure confidence in the value of the
provided answers.
The three research questions in section 1.2 are designed to test this hypothe-
sis. The hypothesis states that an expert user, both as a content creator and
a consumer, will have increased participation and satisfaction from an online
community that is built upon the technology developed in this dissertation.
As a content creator in a QA system, recommendation as defined in section
4.1 increases expert satisfaction because recommendation lowers the barrier of
entry to providing expertise in the form of answering questions. This recom-
mendation process ensures that content creators can be occupied by answering
questions from within their areas of interest, thereby creating an intrinsic re-
ward for participation and increasing satisfaction. This has been explored in
the work surrounding research question 1. Work supporting research ques-
tions 2 and 3 develop extrinsic motivators based on the concept of systemic
reciprocal rewards. These rewards are developed in chapter 5 and shown to
be vastly preferred over the standard model in section 5.1. These incentives
are designed to increase the participation of experts as content creators.
In a QA system a consumer is one who asks questions or uses the pool
of answered questions as a reference. As a consumer, recommendation as de-
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scribed in section 4.1 increases expert satisfaction by assuring the user that
questions have been seen by the most appropriate experts. A possible exten-
sion to this recommendation is to provide the consumer with a quantitative
measure of the respondents’ expertise and how well it matches a given ques-
tion. As a consumer, participation is increased by the proliferation of experts
and the availability of valuable content within the community.
The expertise models developed in chapter 4 demonstrate the capability
of identifying experts in various types of communities based on the content
that is contributed by the user and also the link structure that emerges from
the social features of various types of online communities. These expertise
models facilitate recommendation, which acts as an intrinsic motivator toward
participation because it helps to make the process of answering questions easy
and enjoyable. Addressing the final research question concerning mechanism
design, section 5.2 contains the design and development of a novel mechanism
that is tested in a software simulation presented in section 5.3.
A promising area for future work involves examining the behavior of live
users operating under the novel incentive mechanism. This work shows that
live survey respondents have expressed preference for such a mechanism, but
this is not necessarily an indicator of how they would behave in a live system.
A test in a real-world environment would make a more convincing argument for
a new class of incentives. Additionally, research on a live system would allow
further development toward an optimal mechanism. The parameters of the
simulation in section 5.3, while based on observations and analysis of existing
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QA forums, have been chosen to best approximate generalized behavior in QA
systems. Mechanism optimization is highly domain dependent, and different
QA systems have very different dynamic behavior.
A natural continuation of this work involves adapting this class of in-
centive mechanisms to other types of online communities. The foundation
of adapting expertise models to news aggregation sites and content oriented
social networks in general is demonstrated in section 4.2. An adaptation to
networking oriented social networks such as Facebook and LinkedIn would be
particularly interesting. Currently these sites rely primarily on intrinsic re-
wards; linking to someone is its own reward. A layer of incentives on top of
such communities could spur future growth.
An online Question and Answer system is a prime example of a peer
production system [49]. In a QA system, a self-organized community emerges,
and the producers of content are also the consumers. One of the greatest
strengths of such systems, as well as a potential criticism, is the democratiza-
tion of knowledge (DOK).
DOK describes the way knowledge is constructed and disseminated. A
body of public knowledge can be manipulated by the people, not necessarily
experts. Often this is seen as a good thing, such as the sharing of education
materials by universities [25]. A benefit of this is that knowledge is no longer
kept secret. Via the internet, people with specialized knowledge are able to
garner a larger audience than possible before. It is revolutionizing the way
course materials are disseminated at top universities [25]. Moreover, knowledge
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can be contributed in a distributed fashion, giving everyone the ability to share
and modify the knowledge originating from others (e.g. Wikipedia).
The QA system discussed in this dissertation, along with other types
of online communities, supports these positive traits of DOK by sharing the
results of all historic and current questions and their respective answers with
all users, regardless of participation. Everybody has access to the information,
and everyone is capable of adding to the information by providing an answer.
Some serious drawbacks to DOK exist. According to Hofstadter, DOK
encourages anti-intellectualism and utilitarianism [35]. Much like design by
committee, DOK can result in banal knowledge findings, since people must
have agreement or it will likely be changed. Just like design by committee
automobiles end up looking amorphous, DOK can result in knowledge that
is least objectionable or safe. This makes it difficult to express controversial
concepts, and opinions must be surrounded by the appropriate caveats. More-
over, this encourages noise, or the dissemination of knowledge that everyone
already knows.
The online communities supported by this research combat these draw-
backs by preserving author identity. Experts are recognized, and their contri-
butions are rewarded. An author is accountable for his work, and there are
consequences of providing useful content, through influence advancement, and
also for providing negligible content, through wasted time and effort. Because
anyone can create an answer and read existing answers, but each answer is the
work of one identified contributor, a QA system is able to leverage the positive
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aspects of democratization of knowledge while avoiding the negative aspects
such as censorship and banality.
This dissertation proposes an engineering solution to a fundamentally
human problem. The proposed expertise modeling process, recommendation
architecture, and incentive mechanism are designed to lower the barrier to
entry and encourage expert participation in online communities. Increased
expert participation ensures added value, and in the context of QA systems,
accurate solutions and satisfied questioners. The impact of this work extends
beyond QA and applies to peer production systems in general. The research
presented here is the first to show how content generated by peers, with no
intermediate monetary value, can directly motivate people to apply their ex-
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